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Until recently the most common type of conflict to be found during the 
process of EU enlargement was the distributional conflict. Theory of EU 
enlargement tells us that this type of conflict occurs when concerns arise, 
among existing EU members, of uneven distribution of enlargement costs and 
benefits due to an accession of a new member. The theory proposes two 
mechanisms to solve the conflict. First, temporary exclusion of the new 
member from enjoying certain EU policies (or the EU acquis communautaire). 
Second, compensation of the loser - the existing EU member - by a third party. 
More recently however, another kind of conflict – a non-distributional conflict 
- has emerged that challenges the dominant theoretical discourse. This type of 
conflict is not financial or economic in nature, is not related to the EU acquis, 
and therefore cannot be solved with either of the two mechanisms. Since 1994 
four EU members have used veto to block accession negotiations of their 
neighboring, EU candidate countries. The reasons for blockades were not 
related to the EU acquis, but instead to territory, identity or a mixture of both. 
This thesis looks at the cases of Croatia and Macedonia to answer the puzzle 
of why have non-distributional conflict cases appeared late in the history of 
EU enlargement, and why this new type of conflict seems to be linked with the 
Western Balkans.   
 
Keywords: EU enlargement, distributional conflict, veto, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Western Balkans   
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"In this part of the world it is difficult to find the true path between reason and 
emotion, myth and reality. This is the burden of the Balkans, which prevents 
us from becoming truly European." - Kiro Gligorov First President of the 
Republic of Macedonia (Liotta 2001, 304). 
 
The Balkan Peninsula is a geographical region situated in southeastern 
Europe between the Adriatic Sea in the west, the Ionian and Aegean seas in 
the south and the Black Sea in the east. A playground where major European 
powers competed for territory and influence through most of its history, today 
however, one way of looking at the region is as a blank spot on what is 





Figure 1: EU members in 2014 (Source: www.eurocontrol.int) 
 
This description is not meant to be cynical, but rather to indicate how the EU 
has, in my opinion, lost interest in its own backyard. Ironically, it is there 
among impoverished but proud peoples of the Balkans that joining the EU is 
still seen as a goal worth aspiring to, and a necessary if not final destination 
before they can once again reclaim European identity and rejoin European 
family.1   
At the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, countries and territories 
in the Balkans not yet part of the EU were collectively branded the Western 
                                                
1 Croatian state officials, particularly former prime minister Ivo Sanader, have on 
numerous occasions used the phrase “rejoining the European family” to send a 
message how the EU is Europe and how failing to join the Union would equal to 
failing to reclaim historical place Croats had always been a part of. Many other 
Eastern European officials made similar statements before their countries joined the 
EU. For more details see Schimmelfennig 2001, 68.  
3 
 
Balkans, and nominally given a clear endorsement for future membership in 
the European Union. 2  The Western Balkans consists of at least seven 
territories and includes Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania.3  
 
Figure 2: The Western Balkans (Source: Regional Environmental Center, 
www.rec.org). 
 
                                                
2 The same message was repeated in 2008. “The future of the Western Balkans lies 
in the EU. The EU stresses the importance of peace, stability and security in this part 
of Europe, and welcomes all efforts of the Western Balkan countries to come closer 
to the EU, meeting the necessary conditions. The Western Balkans have the potential 
to accelerate their course towards eventual EU membership, provided they pursue 
the path of reform and reconciliation, and meet the necessary conditions. The EU will 
assist them in this endeavor” (European Commission 2008, 21).    
3 Macedonia’s officially recognized UN name is the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM). For the purpose of this thesis I will refer to it simply as the 
Republic of Macedonia or Macedonia. 
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As the world has recently marked the centenary of the assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo and with it start of the World War I 
(WWI) in 1914, it is hard to imagine how another event in the Balkans could 
lead to a similar outcome. Indeed, Europe today is in many ways a different 
place than a century ago, owing much of the peace and prosperity to the 
success of the EU and the project of European integration. In 2012 the Nobel 
Peace Prize was awarded to the EU “for advancing the causes of peace, 
reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Europa 2013).  
Yet, as I argue in this thesis, as much as the EU has helped bring and extend 
the “zone of peace and prosperity“ (Schimmelfennig 2001, 50) to large swaths 
of the European continent, the centenary of the First World War is an 
opportunity to remind ourselves that there are European countries which are 
not yet part of that zone and, where peace, more than prosperity, is not yet a 
permanent feature. Most of the countries belonging to the Western Balkans 
are yet to join the EU and would greatly benefit from the membership, given 
how widespread and deeply rooted nationalism is still in the region and, more 
importantly, the devastation and atrocities that nationalistic politics brought in 
the 1990s.4 Genocide, ethnic cleansing and unmarked civilian mass graves 
rather than football hooliganism and street violence are what characterizes 
nationalism in the Balkans. Ethnicity and religion come together, like two 
sides of the same coin, in constituting national identity.5 It is worth keeping in 
                                                
4 While accepting the Honorary Citizen of Sarajevo award, respected Bosnian public 
intellectual, writer and former lecturer at University of Paris III: Sorbonne Nouvelle 
and Sapienza in Rome, Predrag Matvejević recently commented on the widespead 
nationalism in the Balkans and added how in Bosnia and Herzegovina people judge a 
person according to how nationalistic he/she is and “are you for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or for another republic that your nation belongs to” (Vijesti 2013).   
5 Nationalism in most countries of the Western Balkans has historically started as 
sociopolitical movements, similar to other Eastern European countries. As such the 
movements were characterized by “rediscovery of its history, the revival of its 
vernacular language through such disciplines as philology and lexicography, the 
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mind that it was nationalism that resulted in the disintegration of Yugoslavia.6 
In this regard, despite the fact that the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has by now tried most of those responsible for 
genocide and war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, trials have unfortunately 
not brought much needed closure, let alone reconciliation to the peoples of 
the former Yugoslavia. In fact, one could easily argue that the ICTY trials 
have even further reinforced already existing, deeply entrenched nationalistic 
sentiments between Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians. 
Nationalism is still the defining feature of domestic politics in Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. And while another inter-
state conflict in the Western Balkans is not an imminent but rather a remote 
possibility, membership in the EU is the only proven way to insure a long term 
peace and stability in the region.7 In other words, full membership in Euro-
Atlantic organizations, especially in the EU and NATO, is the best long term 
solution for ensuring that nationalism in the Western Balkans stays under 
control and does not morph into yet another ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, up 
to date, only Croatia has managed to join both NATO and EU, while Albania 
is a member of NATO.  
                                                                                                                           
cultivation of its literature, especially drama and poetry, and the restoration of its 
vernacular arts and crafts, as well as its music, including native dance and folksong” 
(Smith 2001, 7). However, nationalism in the Western Balkans has since morphed 
into an ethnic, “blood-and-soil” form, which encompasses religion to constitute 
national identity. For more on nationalism see Smith 2001, and Hroch 1985.  
6  Much has been written on this topic, some of the academic books include: 
Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse by Christopher Bennet (1995), Ethnic Cleavages and 
Conflict: The Sources of National Cohesion and Disintegration: The Case Study of 
Yugoslavia by Gojko Vuckovic (1997), Yugoslavia: A Death of a Nation by Laura 
Silber and Allan Little (1997), Balkan Babel by Sabrina Ramet (2002), Yugoslavia’s 
Ruin: The Bloody Lessons of Nationalism, A Patriot’s Warning by Cvijeto Job (2002). 
7 EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina - EUFOR Althea - with staff of 
about 600 men – as well as the legal and administrative EULEX mission in Kosovo 
are both valuable initiatives but are short to medium term measures that do not 
provide a long term guarantee of peace and stability to those countries and the region 
as a whole. For more information on EUFOR Althea see http://www.euforbih.org/, and 




Keeping in mind the current political context in the Western Balkans, one 
would expect those Western Balkan countries that had been given approval 
by the European Commission to start EU negotiations – like Macedonia for 
example - to be able to launch them. Instead, what we have been witnessing 
are cases where a neighbouring country (always an existing EU member) 
blocks a candidate country over unresolved bilateral dispute that are not part 
of the formal content of EU negotiations - the chapters of the EU acquis 
communautaire and the Copenhagen criteria. 8  In the history of EU 
enlargement, I argue that these cases are relatively new phenomena and 
their numbers are few. This is perhaps the main reason why the dominant 
theoretical approaches - Frank Schimmelfennig’s social-constructivist 
approach and Andrew Moravcsik’s rational intergovernmentalism – focus on 
historically most common type of conflict between an existing EU member 
and a candidate country, that of distributional conflict. This type of conflict is 
always economic or financial in nature. However, as I will futher elaborate in 
chapter two, with all the strenghts of the distributional conflict theory, the fact 
that it cannot explain cases where conflict between EU members and 
candidate countries is non-economic or non-financial in nature – but instead 
revolves around territory, identity or both - is significant, even if the number of 
those cases is smaller. Smaller numbers alone do not make these cases less 
relevant. In fact, methodology wise, single case studies can be used to test 
established theory, in what is known as critical cases. “The single case can 
                                                
8 Copenhagen criteria or accession criteria were first elaborated at the Copenhagen 
European Council in 1993. The criteria for accession includes the following three 
aspects: “political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economic: existence of a 
functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union; [and] acceptance of the Community acquis: ability 
to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union” (Europa 2014). 
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[…] be used to determine whether a theory’s propositions are correct or 
whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant” (Yin 
2009, 47).9  
 
Joining the EU was for many Eastern European countries in the 1990s a 
historical goal of strategic political importance. Similar conclusions can be 
made for most, if not all Western Balkan, countries today. Among the many 
reasons for joining the EU is a general belief among citizens that EU 
membership will increase peoples livelihoods as many media reports 
emphasize how most of the new the EU members from Eastern Europe have, 
since joining, performed well economically.  
 
In addition, membership in the EU is strongly linked with national identitiesand 
the lack of collective-national self-respect.10 Statements such as “We have 
always belonged to Western civilization” or “Once we enter the EU, we will be 
joining other European nations as equals and be leaving the Balkans for 
good”, the latter one often repeated by the former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo 
                                                
9 In regard to importance of single case studies or small number case studies, Ronald 
Rogowski uses several important examples of comparativists to argue that “1) all of 
them tested, relied on, or proposed, clear and precise theories; and 2) all focused on 
anomalies, either in prevailing theories or in the world – cases that contradicted 
received beliefs or unexpected regularities that were too pronounced to be accidental” 
(Rogowski 2010, 95).   
10 Former Slovenian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Alojz Peterle said explained 
how Slovenia rebranded itself in the early 1990s: “At the beginning we had to explain 
to our [European] interlocutors the origins of Slovenia. In these years we were able to 
re-establish the image of Slovenia as a Central European and Mediterranean country 
and not as a Balkan state. […] “The more that our Western partners were coming to 
us the more they discovered that Slovenia was a quiet, Western country. Once I 
spoke with Chancellor Kohl in Budapest, in July 1990, I think. He said, ‘We know your 
origin. You belong to our cultural and civilization circle.’” Peterle sees similar trend 
with Macedonia and Croatia ““I think that they are using the same wording as we did, 
before we said, we are one of the European countries, geographically, historically, 
culturally. We belong to Europe, no doubt, but we are not yet members of the 
European Union. Now you can find the same language in Croatia, Macedonia […] 
(ESI 2009).  
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Sanader, tells us how strongly the idea of re-gaining European identity is 
interwined with joining the EU. 11 Not surprisingly then, the blockade of EU 
accession by a neigbouring EU member over an unresolved bilateral dispute 
that is not related to the chapters of EU acquis communautaire is received as 
a shock – if not a treason - by a candidate country, and perceived as an 
extremely unjust roadblock on the road to a country’s better future. 12 
Moreover, blockade feeds and reinforces existing nationalistc sentiment 
among the citizens of a candidate country.  
 
Simply because this type of non-distributional cases of conflict have so far 
been rarer than cases of distributional conflict does not mean that the same 
trend will continue in the future. Given the large number of unresolved 
bilateral disputes among Western Balkan countriesand prevalence of 
nationalism in domestic politics it is not hard to envision, for example, Croatia 
blocking Serbia’s EU accession negotiations or Macedonia one day blocking 
Albania, or vice verse. 13  In fact, this trend might have already started. In 
                                                
11 Third paragraph of the “Declaration of Croatian EU Membership as Strategic 
Importance for Croatia” voted on 19.01.2012. begins with “Starting from the fact that 
the Republic of Croatia belongs to Europe's millennial culture and civilization…” For 
full text see: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2012_01_11_282.html  
12  EU’s acquis communautaire is an amalgam of all the EU laws, norms and 
principles. The acquis is divided according to issue areas into 35 chapters. These 
chapters constitute a formal content of EU enlargement negotiations.   
13 The Western Balkans might not be a tinderbox on par with some other regions in 
the world. However, there are several widely recognized flashpoints that could 
escalate into conflict (either intra-state or inter-state) if they are not dealt with soon. 1) 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, constitutional reform and threats of secession frequently 
made by the leadership of Republika Srpska (the latter, if it happens, would force 
Serbia and Croatia to react in some way). 2) Normalization of relations between 
Kosovo and Serbia, and 3) Pan-Albanianism (this issue alone has potential to affect 
Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia) and the future of ethnic Albanians in 
Macedonia who constitute 25% of Macedonian population. For more see reports and 
analysis by International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org/en.aspx). For an 
insightful overview of long and complicated relations – including open disputes - 
between Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria see Tony Barber’s article “Frustration rules 
during wait for seat at EU table” in Financial Times’ 2013 report on Macedonia 
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December 2012 - three years after Greece had first blocked Macedonia’s EU 
accession over the name dispute – Bulgaria joined Greece in vetoing 
Macedonia’s starting date for EU negotiations. Bulgarian President Rosen 
Plevneliev and Prime Minister Boyko Borisov at the EU Council summit 
accused Macedonia of “waging an anti-Bulgarian campaign and of replacing 
historical facts” (BalkanInsight 2012). In his statement the Bulgarian President 
ironically raised the need for Macedonia to “start applying the European 
approach towards its neighbours, without claims and manipulations” 
(EuroActiv 2012). In return for its support, “Bulgaria demanded the signing of 
a friendship and cooperation deal, joint government sessions as well as an 
agreement for joint celebrations of notable personalities and events “in our 
common history”” (Balkaninsight 2012).  
 
At the press conference held after meeting the Bulgarian President Rosen 
Plevneliev, the EU Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle pointed out the 
obvious link between prolonged blockade and the further rise of nationalism:     
 
“I am one of those people who believe that it is not good to leave our 
partners waiting before the door for too long. I believe that integration 
is the best means for coping with nationalism, and I am convinced 
that isolation boosts nationalism” (Euroactiv 2012; Novinite 2012).   
 
International Crisis Group (ICG), one of the world’s leading NGOs on conflict 
resolution, shared the similar conclusion - but wider in scope - in their 2011 
report:  
                                                                                                                           
(http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/dde7528a-1a95-11e3-93e8-





“As [International] Crisis Group has repeatedly argued, the [name] 
dispute risks derailing the strategies of the EU and NATO to stabilise 
Macedonia and the wider region through integration and 
enlargement” (ICG 2011). 
 
What the EU Enlargment Commissioner and particulary the ICG are implying 
is in line with a standard social-constructivist argument in international 
relations theory which stresses the importance of norms and socialization. 
Looking things through this prism, one could argue that once all states in 
dispute become members of the same club, socialization would work toward 
all of them adhering to certain norms of expected behavior. This way, 
socialization can eventually change state interests. As Gergana Noutcheva, 
South-East Europe analyst for the Center for European Policy Studies 
explains; 
 
“In the EU context, Europeanization is an interactive process in 
which member states affected by the process of EU integration are 
at the same time the players who initiate and shape this process. 
There is thus a two-way relationship between structure and agency. 
Agency is transformed as a result of participation in EU structures. 
Transformed agency can then lead to a further transformation of 
structures, triggering a cyclical interrelationship between the two” 




However, the Europeanization effect built into the EU conditionality - 
responsible for trenmendous transformation of “the governing structures, 
economy and civil society” (Noutcheva et al. 2004, 11) of Eastern European 
countries - cannot proceed when a blockade is imposed on a candidate 
country. 14 Therefore, an important avenue of conflict defusion and settlement 
is denied.15  
 
The most recent case between Bulgaria and Macedonia suggests that using 
unresolved bilateral disputes - which are not related to the EU acquis - as a 
reason to block or veto a candidate country’s EU accession negotiations is at 
least an allowed tool at the disposal of an EU member – if perhaps not yet a 
norm - which can be used with little or no negative consequences.   
 
I suggest defining blockade or vetoing in the following fashion: a situation 
when a candidate country’s EU negotiations cannot begin or continue until a 
                                                
14  “The main thrust of the EU conditionality model is based on cost-benefit 
calculations in which domestic change is a response by the applicants to the material 
and social benefits offered by the EU, such as financial and technical assistance, 
institutional ties, market access and an invitation to begin accession negotiations” 
(Noutcheva et al. 2004, 11). For more see Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S. and 
Knobel, H. “Costs, Commitment, and Compliance. The Impact of EU Democratic 
Conditionality on European Non-Member States”, EUI Working Paper RSC 2002/29 
(Florence: EUI, 2002). 
15 “In the sphere of conflict settlement, the EU’s policy of ‘carrots and sticks’ and its 
direct involvement as a mediator in a secessionist conflict constitute the core of its 
potential for exerting influence. Thanks to its superior power vis-à-vis the parties, the 
EU is in a position either directly to coerce them into agreeing on an acceptable 
solution or indirectly to shift the domestic balance of power by encouraging moderate 
groups and discouraging hard-liners. The strongest incentive the EU can put on the 
negotiating table to guide nudge the parties towards a conflict settlement is the 
prospect of EU membership, but other forms of partnership with the EU are also an 
option. In particular, progressive inclusion in EU common policies such as the single 
market or justice and home affairs, without formal institutional insertion into EU 
structures, can also act as a strong inducement. These ultimate rewards give the EU 
the leverage necessary to demand institutional and policy changes that are a matter 
of dispute between the parties involved in a conflict.” (Noutcheva et al. 2004, 12). 
Although Noutcheva et al. discuss EU’s “carrots and sticks” approach in regard to 
secessionist conflicts, the logic is, in my opinion, still the same and can be applied to 
diffuse existing bilateral problems among the Western Balkan countries.   
12 
 
bilateral dispute with an existing EU member is resolved. Bilateral disputes 
are always an issue that pre-exists the EU negotiations of a candidate country 
and is never directly related to the EU acquis – chapters that are the official 
content of the negotiations. Attempts can be made by the blocking country to 
link or frame the dispute within the EU acquis in order to legitimize the veto. 
However, the fact that a dispute is non-EU acquis related greatly complicates 
the situation for a candidate country since there are no formal benchmarks 
and independent reviews – which exist for each of the 35 chapters of the EU 
acquis – to help solve the disputed issue. Thus, a blockade resembles a 
blackmail in which a candidate country has very little room for manoeuvre. A 
candidate country can therefore either accept the conditions set forth by the 
blocking country or reject them. In arguably best case, it can hope – or lobby - 
for a larger EU member to get directly involved and mediate the solution, as 
was the case with Spanish Prime Minister Javier Solana who helped broker 
the deal between Italy and Slovenia in 1994 (Bucar and Binar 2005). 
However, direct mediation by a large EU member does not automatically 
guarantee success, as the case of French EU Presidency failed attempt to lift 
Slovenia’s veto over Croatia’s EU negotiations demonstrated.16 On the other 
hand, the UN mediation seems to be the least effective as years of failed 
negotiations between Greek and Macedonian officials to solve the name 
dispute would suggest.  
 
Finally, the politics of veto is usage of blockade – by a EU member – to 
achieve certain domestic goals.17 
 
                                                
16 http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/france-fails-unblock-croatia-tur-news-220955  
17 I credit European Stability Initiative (ESI) for coining this term.  
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The puzzle this thesis is tackling can be summarized along these two 
questions: Why are cases of non-distributional conflict of a more recent date 
(post Cold War) in the EU enlargement history? And why are they more 
prevalent in the Western Balkans?  The answer to both question lies in an 
observation that all four cases of non-distributional conflict – or blockades – 
can fit the following three categories: Territory, Identity or both Territory and 
Identity. 18 Because state formation in the Western Balkanshas either only 
recently been consolidated or in some cases is still an ongoin process, the 
issues of territory and identity – including here culture and history – are high 
on the domestic political agenda. 19 In such domestic socio-political 
environment, leaders can easily turn old animosities betweeen neigbouring 
countries into nationalistic hatred that later limits their options for finding a 
compromising solution, making the good rapport between state leaders 
extremely important.    
 
After examining all the four cases of blockades, I am proposong the following 
argument: If two neighbouring countries - one being an EU member, the other 
a candidate country - have unresolved issues related to territory, identity or 






                                                
18 Italy-Slovenia, Slovenia-Croatia, Greece-Macedonia and Bulgaria-Macedonia 
19 Or even identity building, as we will see in the chapter on Macedonia.   
20 Although I did not include the blockade of Turkish EU accession negotiations 
among the four cases, if we look closely at the Turkish case it would fit into categories 
that I have proposed – territory and identity.  
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1.1. Eastern Europe and Western Balkans  
 
EU accession of countries of the Western Balkans need to be placed into a 
wider context of 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement to Eastern European 
countries. 21 Similarities between countries of the Western Balkans and post-
Communist Eastern European countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 
2007, go beyond simply sharing a common former ideology. 22 Although more 
than four decades of communism have served to level up these societies in 
the socio-economic arena, communist experience can be seen as an 
additional layer to an already existing wealth of close historical, cultural and 
linguistic ties shared by Eastern European countries from Lithuania and 
Poland in the north, to Macedonia and Romania in the south. However, this is 
where the comparison between countries of Eastern Europe and most 
countries of the Western Balkans unfortunately end. Eastern European 
countries that became EU members in 2004 and 2007 did not experience the 
brutality of ethnic conflict and did not have to deal with its long lasting 
consequences on domestic politics. 23  They did face numerous socio-
economic, political and administrative challenges on their way to full 
membership of the EU (Stirk and Weigall 1999). That process was without a 
doubt demanding and took years to finalize. But the war in former Yugoslavia 
in early 1990s and ethnic insurgency in Macedonia in 2001 irreversibly 
changed the course of the region in terms of the EU accession process, 
compared to other post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. While 
                                                
21 Throughout this thesis I will refer to all of the post-Communist countries that joined 
the EU so far as Eastern European countries. To avoid potential analytical confusion I 
will refrain from dividing them between Central and Eastern European countries. 
22 In 2004: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Slovenia. In 2007: Bulgaria and Romania.   
23 War in Slovenia lasted only 10 days and lacked the defining element of ethnic and 
religious communitarian violence that other conflicts in former Yugoslavia had.  
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Poland, Hungary and other East European countries moved forward on the 
path to join the European Union, most countries of the Western Balkans 
made large steps backward. More than a decade after the 2003 EU summit in 
Thessaloniki, only Croatia can claim EU membership while others are yet to 
be granted the status of candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo) or have gained that status but are still waiting to 
launch formal negotiations (Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia).  It seems 
that the blank spot on the EU map is there to stay despite the fact that 
countries in both regions were given the same clear perspective of one day 
becoming full members of the EU if they successfully meet all the official 
requirements, known as the Copenhagen criteria. Despite the promise of a 
future within the EU, unambiguously issued at the 2003 EU-Western Balkan 
summit in Thessaloniki, the member states have nonetheless allowed Greece 
and Slovenia to use unresolved bilateral problems with EU candidates 
(Croatia and Macedonia) to derail the candidate states’ EU accession 
processes. The fact that these bilateral disputes were framed using nationalist 
narratives is alarming given the ethno-nationalist nature of the conflicts that 
ravaged the region in the early 1990s and 2001. 
 
However, ethnic conflict being a distinct feature of post-communist Balkans, 
in addition to the Copenhagen criteria, most aspirants from this region had 
another requirement in the form of full cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Nonetheless, cooperation 
with the ICTY is not what makes the Croatian and Macedonian cases different 
from previous waves of enlargement. It is the blockade of their accession 
negotiations by neighboring EU members over bilateral disputes that are not 
16 
 
related to the EU acquis communautaire or the Copenhagen criteria. 
Therefore, despite numerous examples over the decades of political conflicts 
and threats during EU negotiations between EU member states and 
candidate countries, the blockades of Croatian and Macedonian negotiations 
are new phenomena, staring after the Cold War and with the preparations for 
the 2004 enlargement.24 
 
Comparisons with the French veto of UK membership are not entirely valid, 
although technically French president Charles de Gaulle did veto UK’s 
accession application twice. A closer look at the French veto reveals strategic 
and geopolitical reasons for blockade rather than concrete bilateral dispute. It 
was the De Gaulle’s belief that the nature of the Community would change if 
Britain were allowed to join, instead of unresolved, open, bilateral disputes 
between the two countries. 25 As De Gaulle stressed in his speech from 1963: 
 
“In short, the nature, the structure, the economic situation, that 
characterize England, differ profoundly from the Continent. How then 
could England, as she lives, as she produces, as she trades, be 
incorporated into the Common Market as it was conceived and as it 
works?”  (Nicholson and East 1987, 39).  
 
                                                
24 Along with Croatian and Macedonian cases there are two more cases: The 1994 
property dispute between Italy and Slovenia, and more recent – 2012- Bulgarian veto 
of the start of the Macedonian EU accession negotiations.    
25 As well as the changes in the decision making in the Community, or in other words, 
balance of power within the Community. In my opinion a very similar reason has been 
used for a while, although not openly, to slow down Turksih EU accession. However, 
the Turkish case is indeed more complicated because Turkish blockade of EU 
negotiations could also fit into categories of territory and identity. 
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It is widely accepted that De Gaulle’s perception of UK as a “Trojan Horse” 
was rooted in geopolitics and his concerns with France loosing its dominant 
position in the European Economic Community (EEC):   
 
“For De Gaulle the political consequences were, as always, 
controlling… What he wanted was French supremacy in Western 
Europe [and] the meaning of [accepting Britain into Europe] was 
plain.  France would not be the sole nuclear power in the European 
community, and French political influence would be that much less” 
(Newhouse 1970, 226).  
 
De Gaulle’s veto resembled rivalry over vision and leadership of Europe. This 
case represents, arguably, a unique occurrence in the history of enlargement 
when a large EU member vetoes another equally large candidate country 
over long-term strategic reasons. Therefore, De Gaulle did not have a 
concrete bilateral dispute with Britain; he simply did not want UK to join the 
EEC as the following anecdote indicates:    
 
“When Reginald Maudling, the chief British negotiator, asked Robert 
Marjolin, an EEC Commissioner who had been a French negotiator 
of the Treaty of Rome and a technocrat relatively open to 
transatlantic ties, what France would do if Britain agreed to all its 
conditions, he replied: “We [would] just have to think of new reasons 




The geopolitical and strategic dimensions found in the French veto were 
unique factors because in the cases of Croatia’s and Macedonia’s blockades, 
their future within the EU future was never disputed.26 As Croatian President 
Ivo Josipovic recently emphasized: “EU considers the entire region [Western 
Balkans] as part of Europe and that the future of all countries is inside the EU” 
(Slobodna Dalmacija 2014).   
 
Despite sharing the same normative goals toward Eastern Europe and the 
Western Balkans, the EU’s enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans 
has lost a common European voice it had toward Eastern European countries 
and has instead been hijacked by narrow interests of neighboring EU 
members.27 Despite losing some of its appeal in recent years, membership in 
the EU is still the most powerful leverage for achieving long lasting peace and 
stability in the region, and EU’s normative power is therefore not in question.  
 
1.2. Non-Distributional Conflict 
 
The non-distributional conflict cases that this thesis discusses can be 
categorized using the following characteristics related to the nature of the 
conflict and characteristics related to the blocking EU member.  
 
                                                
26 German Chancellor Angela Merkel is planning to organize a high level political 
conference on the Western Balkans at the end of August 2014. In that regard she 
was quoted saying: “Germany will invite all Balkan states to a conference in the end 
of August to make it clear that we want to support each other and look to the future 
together. This is also why we have a strong presence in the region” (EurActiv 2014).   
27 According to Karen E. Smith, the principal objective of the 2004 enlargement was 
to “support the economic and political transformation in Eastern Europe and thus 
ensure security and stability” (Smith, ix). As Smith argues, the member states have 
always managed to put aside individual differences and come together with a unified 
foreign policy position vis-a-vis accession countries in Eastern Europe. 
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A) Characteristics of the nature of the conflict: 
 
1) Conflict is, as already stated above, non-economic or non-financial in 
nature the way distributional conflicts are, and therefore cannot be settled 
by applying one of two ways discussed in chapter two - temporary 
exclusion of a new EU member in enjoying certain rights or policies, or 
compensation of an existing, older EU member.  
2) Conflict is always bilateral and predates EU accession negotiations of a 
candidate country. 
3) Conflict is non-EU acquis related –not directly related to the chapters 
that are the content of EU negotiations or the Copenhagen criteria. The 
blocking EU member can nonetheless attempt to link the dispute with EU 
acquis in order to justify the veto. 
 
B) Characteristics of the EU member that vetoes or blocks a candidate 
country – a blocking EU member:  
 
1) The EU member that blocks or vetoes a candidate country is always a 
neighbouring country, sharing physical borders with the candidate country.  
2) The blocking EU member understands the strategic, if not historic, 
significance of EU membership for a candidate country.  
 
Lastly, important assumption has to be pointed out. Although conflicts 
between EU members and candidate countries are common during 
negotiation talks, in non-distributional cases of conflict that this thesis 
discusses, the conflict escalated from threats to an actual blockade or veto.  
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Laying down the key characteristics of non-distributional conflict cases, the 
first case that fits these criteria is the Italian blockade of Slovenian EU 
accession negotiations in 1994. The cause of the blockade was a property 
dispute with Italy:  
 
“Italy as a neighbouring state recognised Slovenia as an 
independent state together with most of the countries of the EU (on 
15 January 1992). However, it immediately raised the issue of the 
status of the Italian minority in Slovenia. Italy's diplomatic activities 
and allegations, all reports of international observer missions 
notwithstanding, resulted in the fact that Slovenia became a member 
of the [Council of Europe] as late as 14 May 1993, almost a year 
after it had been admitted to the UN. In the meantime, in August 
1992, Italy recognised Slovenia's right to succession to all relevant 
treaties (some 50 in number) that had been concluded between Italy 
and Yugoslavia. Among them was the Treaty of Rome (1983), an 
agreement on compensation for the expropriated Italian property in 
the border area. […]  
"But after the political situation in Italy changed and the right-centre 
government of Silvio Berlusconi and Gianfranco Fini came to power 
(10 May 1994), Italy refused to honour this contract and demanded 
the return of property in kind. Since Slovenia refused to accept this 
claim and insisted on the respect of international law, Italy vetoed 
negotiations on the Europe Agreement. It claimed that Slovenian 
legislation was not in accord with European legislation as regards the 
purchase of land by foreigners. It was of little help for Slovenia to 
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argue that an obligation to sell land to foreigners is relevant only after 
a state becomes a member of the EU (according to the principle of 
the free movement of capital) or that no similar demands have been 
made to other countries which had signed Europe Agreements.” […] 
“The Slovenian government had to make a declaration that before 
signing the Europe Agreement it would initiate a change of the 
Constitution allowing for the purchase of land by foreigners, and that 
the amendment to the Constitution would become effective before 
the end of the ratification process” (Bucar and Brinar 2005, 96-97). 
 
The blockade lasted for a year and was finally settled under the Spanish EU 
Presidency. Under the brokered deal – the “Spanish compromise” – “the 
Slovenian side agreed to a provision whereby EU nationals who had legally 
and continuously resided for three years on the present territory of the 
Republic of Slovenia could, subject to reciprocity, acquire title to land” (ESI 
2009).  
 
It is worth noticing two things: First,  because of the deal Slovenia was the 
only accession country at the time that had to “liberalise its property markets 
before accession” (ESI 2009). In other words, the reason for blockade was 
not directly related to EU acquis because other Eastern European countries 
at the time were not asked to comply with this requirement.  Second, and 
more importanty, “the change of the Italian political landscape, leading first to 
technical government under Lamberto Dini and then to a centre-left 
government under Romano Prodi, produced immediate improvements in 
bilateral relations” (ESI 2009). The change of political leadership seems to be 
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an important variable in blockade resolution since the Croatian veto was 
swiftly lifted after the change of Prime Ministers. Good rapport between 
national leaders is a factor that needs to be taken into account. This factor will 
be discussed later in more detail.  
 
In many ways the Italian blockade of Slovenia represents a proto-case or a 
precedent for future veto cases. Ironically, Slovenia will later blockade 
Croatian EU negotiations applying the same Italian formula.  It is, however, 
unlikely that Slovenia will in the future block EU accession of any other 
Western Balkan county, because it does not have unresolved disputes with 
them – teritory wise, identity wise or both. Croatia, on the other hand, does. 
Despite the fact that Croatia has managed to find a way to address the border 
issue with Slovenia and has joined the EU in 2013, the case of Croatian 
blockade is still relevant for the future of EU accession of the Western 
Balkans for two reasons: First, Croatia has unresolved disputes with all of its 
non-EU neighbors (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro). 
Second, there is no consensus among Croatian political elites - from left to 
right - that would unanimously ruleout the use of blockade as a tool to solve 
open disputes with non-EU neighbours. In the past few several years, two 
Croatian prime ministers have had to publicly declare that while they are in 
office, Croatia would not use EU membership as leverage against Serbia. It is 
worth emphasizing that these statements do not represent official party 
positions and are not explicitly enshrined in any official documents.28 In July 
                                                
28 Moreover, one of those former prime ministers is now serving a jail sentence for 
corruption while the other is most certainly going to be ousted by a new, more right 
than central, leadership of the most influential party in Croatia, the Croatian 
Democratic Party (HDZ). Therefore there is no guarantee that some time soon in the 
near future the new prime minister from HDZ will refrain from using this bargaining 
chip and block, for example, Serbian accession negotiations to gain concessions on 
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2014 journalist pressed the current Croatian President Ivo Josipovic over the 
same issue. He vowed not to use blockade against Serbia while in office 
(Slobodna Dalmacija 2014). However, his mandate is at the end and the 
political landscape is rapidly changing with central-right Croatian Democratic 
Party (HDZ) winning local and regional elections by wide margins.   
 
1.3. Added Value and Methodology 
 
The added value of this thesis lies in the following three aspects: First, theory 
wise, distributional conflict needs to be revisited and the outlier cases of non-
distributional conflicts between EU members and candidate countries 
explained. This is the first step in what will one day eventually lead to 
adjusting the theory of distributional conflict in order to account for the oulier 
cases.  
 
Second, among many scholars of political science there is an unfortunate 
tendency to look down upon policy, or to entirely distance their work from any 
policy dimension that it might have. I strongly disagree with that view. As 
students of social science at the time when societies around the world are 
plagued with interconnected political, social, economic, environmental and 
other problems, we have moral responsibility – if not professional - to 
contribute with our knowledge and skills to their solution. Having said this, 
policy wise, I believe that ramifications of veoting or blocking of candidate 
countries’ EU aspirations carry an additional, more serious undertone, given 
                                                                                                                           
some unresolved bilateral problem while boosting its domestic standing. Given the 
turn to the right that the new HDZ leadership has taken in the last two years, fueled 
with nationalistic rhetoric, a move like this is highly likely to happen. 
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the region’s recent ethnic conflicts and how widespread nationalism still is in 
the Western Balkans. These ramifications need to be stressed and explained. 
In addition, we have to point out that the EU lacks institutional mechanism in 
dealing with these cases, nor does EU have an explicit, formal rule that would 
prevent these cases from happening. As we have already seen with the 
Slovenian and Croatian case, ad hoc attempts by large EU members are 
inadequate and are no guarantee for sucessful resolution of a bilateral 
dispute.  
 
Lastly, although the thesis is concerned with EU relations with the Western 
Balkans in general, the case studies of Croatia and Macedonia offer a closer 
look at the countries – and their relations with the neighbouring EU members. 
This way, the thesis adds to the study of Europeanization of the Western 
Balkans.  
 
In terms of methodology, I intend to analyze a variety of documents including 
journal articles, think tank reports, media articles, in order to support my 
argument. Media articles were used in majority of cases as a source of 
quotes of EU officials or other political leaders from the Western Balkans. 
Thus, they were rarely used as a source of analysis. Some of the daily 
newspapers and web portals cited in this regard include, for example, 
Slobodna Dalmacija, Jutarnji List, Nacional, Novinite, Financial Times, 
EUobserver, EurActiv etc. Relative poverty of top academic journal articles 
and book chapters on the two case studies that I tackle (particularly in the 
case of Slovenia-Croatia border dispute) is certainly one of the limitations of 
my thesis. However, majority of the think tank analysts whose reports and 
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statements I have used should be considered area studies experts. They 
have spent years, in some cases more than a decade, closely following 
events in the Western Balkans. Many speak local languages and have an 
intimate understanding of mentality, culture and history of the region. The last 
three are critical in understanding intricacies of domestic politics of Balkan 
countries. Some of these think tanks include; European Stability Initiative, 
European Policy Centre, Centre for European Policy Studies and, 
International Relations and Security Network of ETH Zurich.   
  
Another limitation is lack of interviews, particularly face to face with 
officialsfrom Croatia, and analysts from the entire region. 29  Since I speak 
most of the regional languages and have access to several ministries in 
Croatia and civil society through out the Western Balkans, I am confident that 
interviews could had been arranged and that they would have indeed reveal 
details behind the breakthrough of the border dispute between Slovenia and 
Croatia. Interviews with regional analysts and officials would reveal more 
information and better understanding of the name dispute between Greece 
and Macedonia. Unfortunately, more than time, the lack of funding is to be 
blamed.  
 
Following the introductory chapter is the literature review, then the case study 
of Croatia - Slovenia border dispute, case study of Greece – Macedonia name 
dispute and lastly a chapter dedicated to discussion and conclusions.  
  
                                                




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Enlargement of the European Community (EC) and later the European Union 
(EU) has been marked with conflict from the very beginning. 30 According to 
Christina J. Schneider, the very first time the EU was set to expand beyond 
the founding six members, a crisis ensued (Schneider 2009). At the time 
French president Charles de Gaulle outright rejected British application. He 
would go on to veto the UK membership twice, first in 1963 and later in 1967 
“citing the UK’s close relations with the US as one reason why it was not fit to 
join in the European enterprise” (Cameron 2004, 3). Conflict between existing 
members and aspiring applicants would become the norm in every wave of 
future expansion. In this regard, much has been written on the topic of 
distributional conflicts (conflicts that occur when concerns arise, among 
existing EU members, of uneven distribution of enlargement costs and 
benefits) amidst continuing EU enlargement (Baldwin et al. 1997; Brenton 
2002; Breuss 2002; Bori and Brucker 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003 and 2001; 
Torreblanca 2001; Friis and Murphy 1999). And while conflict is an important 
and integral part of the enlargement story, it is not the only one. The other 
part of the story is equally, if not even more important and it needs to be 
emphasized. This is especially the case with the southern European 
expansions (Greece - 1981, Spain and Portugal – 1986) and the Eastern 
European expansions of 2004 and 2007. It is safe to conclude that EU 
membership served as an anchor for consolidation of their young 
democracies.  As Fraser Cameron argues:  
 
                                                
30 In this thesis I will use the term European Union (EU) to also include the older 
European Community (EC).   
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“The enlargements which brought Greece, Spain and Portugal into 
the European Community has as a basic motive the consolidation of 
democracy and stability in countries which had abandoned 
totalitarian regimes. For the countries of central and eastern Europe, 
membership of the Union has a similar significance”. […] “The 
prospect of EU membership continues to offer the best incentive to 
the central and east Europeans to preserve with political and 
economic transformation. The changes which have to be made are 
often painful, and so far have brought little reward for politicians in 
office. Without the sustained encouragement of the EU, a number of 
countries could easily be blown off course” (Cameron 1996, 13). 
 
The transformative powers of the EU accession process are emphasized by 
other scholars as well. According to Karen E. Smith the key objective of the 
2004 enlargement was to “support the economic and political transformation 
in Eastern Europe and thus ensure security and stability” (Smith 1999, ix).  
Andrew Moravcsik sees the 2004 enlargement similarly beneficial for Eastern 
European candidate countries: 
 
“Yet for the construction of a well-functioning market economy and a 
strong, democratic state—long-term goals that are hardly 
contested—the requirements for EU membership have been, on 
balance, positive. They have promoted valuable reforms: creating an 
independent civil service, overhauling the judiciary, improving 
oversight of financial markets, and blocking bailouts of uncompetitive 
but influential sectors […] locking the applicants into the EU legal 
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and regulatory frameworks promises to limit corruption, improve 
administrative capacity, attract foreign investment, and altogether 
facilitate fuller insertion into the EU and global economy—thereby 
bringing substantial returns to the national budget over the long run. 
Entering the EU is expected to raise output and growth rates by 
stimulating entrepreneurship, foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
technology transfers (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003, 47). 
 
Frank Schimmelfennig joins Andrew Moravcsik in praising the EU 
enlargement to Eastern Europe:     
 
“Enlargement can be seen as an instrument to stabilize Central and 
Eastern Europe, to control the negative externalities of political and 
economic transformation in the East, and to expand the borders of 
the EU zone of peace and prosperity (Schimmelfennig 2001, 50). 
 
At this point we should take a larger view of the post-WWII European 
integration project and note how positive, socio-economic and political effects 
these authors point out did not only stop with applicant countries. The 
enlargement of the EU has transformed the entire European continent, 
creating a space of peace and stability where for hundreds of years some of 
the most brutal wars were waged.  
 
In the Foreword to the 2004 volume “The Future of Europe: Integration and 
Enlargement” edited by Fraser Cameron, at the time EU Commissioner 




“It [2004 enlargement] finally brings to an end the division of Europe, 
which resulted from the tragic history of our continent in the twentieth 
century. Looking back over the history of European integration, it is 
striking that the great enterprise was primarily motivated by a desire 
for peace. The concept of peace through integration runs like a 
leitmotif through the sometimes impenetrable integration process” 
(Cameron 2004, x). 
 
The former EU commissioner raised two important, and commonly occurring 
themes: First is a widely held belief that the post-WWII European integration 
process has brought peace and stability to the troubled continent. This belief 
is the principle reason why the EU was awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace 
Prize.31 The Eastern European enlargements of 2004 and 2007 can be seen 
in this light. Fraser Cameron points out that these two most recent waves of 
enlargement “extends to central and eastern Europe the zone of peace, 
stability and prosperity that west Europeans have enjoyed for over forty 
years.” (Cameron 2004, 1).  
 
The second important point brought forth in the paragraph above is that the 
2004 enlargement helped reunify the continent. While there is much truth in 
that, we should also not forget that the process of unification is not yet 
completed. There is still much to be done. That is because not all European 
countries that had ended up on the communist side of the post-WWII divide, 
and whose citizens today overwhelmingly support European integration, have 
                                                
31 “In 2012 the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for advancing the causes of 
peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Europa 2013). 
30 
 
been able to become EU members32. Every country of the Western Balkans 
fits in this description.33  
 
Going back to the beginning of the chapter, while conflict is an integral part of 
the enlargement, and will be further discussed, I would like to amplify (and 
keep in mind) the other message – solidification of peace and stability that the 
EU accession brings - when discussing relations between EU and the 
Western Balkans.  For this reason alone, the EU should have not allowed for 
unsolved bilateral disputes - particularity the ongoing name dispute between 
Macedonia and Greece, and a more recent Bulgarian blockade of Macedonia 
- to paralyze the EU prospects of a candidate country in which ethnic stability 
is still fragile.34  
 
2.1. EU Enlargements and Distributional Conflict  
 
Theory of EU enlargement commonly deals with several questions: 1) why 
the EU keeps expanding, 2) what are the key effects of enlargement on 
                                                
32 We should also not forget Ukraine.  
33 Even in Serbia, public support for joining the EU has been increasing since 2012. 
In March 2014, for example, a public survey showed that 54% of citizens support 
Serbia joining the EU (http://www.euractiv.rs/pregovori-sa-eu/7055-podrka-lanstvu-u-
eu-u-porastu).  
34 Branislav Radeljic argues that; “the EU has heavily relied on enlargement as its 
most celebrated foreign policy tool to penetrate the post-Yugoslav space. While in 
some cases such an approach has produced significant results, in others it has often 
been stuck between EU’s conditionality clauses and the applicants’ willingness to 
comply. As witnessed, not all post-Yugoslav states have perceived and welcomed the 
process of democratization and Europeanization in the same way, although fully 
aware of possible benefits. While some of them have progressed from signing the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) to joining the EU, via various 
adjustments and liberalization plans, others have seriously struggled to pursue the 
necessary reforms and modify their systems in order to secure candidate status and 
eventual membership in the EU” (Radeljic 2013, 3).  While not every Western Balkan 
state have undertaken the necessary reforms to meet various EU accession criteria’s, 
those who have – for example Macedonia – should be rewarded instead of being kept 
in a limbo of the EU waiting room.    
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domestic policies of countries seeking to enter the EU, 3) how newly joined 
EU members affect EU integration, and 4) the distribution of costs and 
benefits among existing EU members and applicant countries 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002). Theoretically speaking, the very last 
question is most interesting for this thesis since it offers an answer to how the 
most common form of conflict between existing members and candidate 
countries - distributional conflict - is solved and settled. Therefore, I will use 
the existing rational and sociological (social-constructivist) approaches in 
attempt to explain the Croatian and Macedonian cases. The main puzzle 
these two different ontological approaches are trying to solve is why 
enlargement takes places despite distributional conflicts between existing 
member states and countries seeking to join the club. This question is 
puzzling in regard to two Mediterranean expansions in the 1980s (Greece – 
1981, Spain and Portugal – 1986) but even more so for the 2004, and 
especially the 2007 enlargement. Scholars “were baffled by the successful 
conclusion of the 2004 Eastern enlargement. The puzzlement grew even 
more acute with the latest expansion when Bulgaria and Romania joined the 
Union in January 2007 even though the anticipated costs of admission by far 
outweighed the gains for several EU members.” (Schneider 2009, 33).  
 
Distributional conflict occurs when concerns arise, among existing EU 
members, of uneven distribution of enlargement costs and benefits.35 Existing 
members states see their material benefits diminished in short or medium 
term due to accession of another country. Because the final decision on 
whether a candidate country can join the EU requires unanimous decision of 
                                                
35 For more general role of international institutions and distributional conflict, see 
Keohane R. and Martin, L. 1995. “The promise of institutionalist theory.” International 
Security 20 (1): 39-51.    
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the Council, a member state can delay the decision until its concerns of 
redistribution of enlargement costs and benefits is addressed (Schneider 
2009).   
 
“Each previous round of EU enlargement has gone through a parallel 
and predictable negotiation process. In these rounds, applicant 
countries have consistently found themselves in a weak negotiating 
position vis-à-vis their EU partners and accordingly have conceded 
much in exchange for membership” (Moravcsik and Vachudova 
2003, 44). 
 
The history of EU enlargement offers ample examples of distributional 
conflicts. For example, during the 2nd Mediterranean expansion, France and 
Ireland had concerns regarding the negative effects of the size of the Spanish 
fishing fleet on the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). In particular, they did not 
want Spain to immediately enjoy the benefits of the CFP and were thus 
seeking a transitional period of 10 years. For this, they were ready to derail 
Spain’s entire accession process. In the end a compromise was made. During 
the same negotiations, Greece, at the time new member of the EU, was 
concerned that with the accession of Portugal and Spain, two relatively poorer 
southern countries, Greece would loose part of the structural aid from the 
European Reconstruction and Development Funds (ERDF). This example of 
distributional conflict was solved only after Germany decided to increase its 
overall contribution to the common budget (Avery and Cameron 1998). More 
recent example during the 2004 enlargement includes Austrian and German 
concern regarding the free movement of workers. Although both countries 
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were supporters of EU expansion to Eastern Europe, they were concerned 
that the inflow of low skilled, cheap workers would disrupt their domestic 
markets. After much wrangling between member states, only Malta and 
Cyprus were exempt from any restrictions. However, free movement of 
workers was limited to all other new EU members.   
 
These cases illustrate two ways in which distributional conflict can be solved 
and therefore costs and benefits can be distributed in favor of enlargement. 
The first way is to temporarily exclude a new member state from enjoying a 
part of the acquis communautaire. “The enlargement gains can be reallocated 
in favor of adversely affected members at the expense of candidates by 
granting newcomers temporarily restricted membership rights” (Schneider 
2009, 7). The second way, as illustrated by the case of Greece and the 
ERDF, is for another member (or members), to compensate the loser.  
 
As mentioned above, there are two ontologically different approaches in 
explaining how the distributional conflicts are settled. The first one is rooted in 
the rationalist tradition where scholars from economy and political science 
use various economic methods, including cost-benefit calculations, to argue 
for EU enlargement.  In the lead up to the 2004 enlargement, the EU15 were 
concerned with the potential financial strain on the EU budget if poorer 
Eastern European countries were admitted to the club. However, Richard E. 
Baldwin came to the following conclusion in 1997:   
 
“Eastern enlargement will be a phenomenally good bargain for the 
incumbent EU15. Sweeping aside questions about the timing of the 
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benefits and budget costs, and the list of countries in the first 
enlargement, the net costs – transfers less benefits – should be 
somewhere between zero and ECU 8 billion. Even the upper bound 
of this range is something like 0.01% of the EU’s 14 GDP. This is an 
extraordinary low cost given the historic nature of the challenge in 
central Europe. Imagine how eager western Europe would have bee 
in 1980 to pay ECU 8 billion a year in order to free central Europe 
from communism and remove Soviet troops from the region” 
(Baldwin et al. 1997, 168).  
 
Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova in their 2003 article start by 
dismissing the “idealistic motivations on the part of European governments” to 
explain the 2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement. Instead, Moravcsik and 
Vachudova make arguments rooted in liberal intergovernmentalism to explain 
enlargement:  
 
“[…] leaders of current EU members are promoting accession 
because they consider enlargement to be in their long-term 
economic and geopolitical interest. While some interest groups in 
current member states oppose enlargement because they will bear a 
disproportionate share of the short-term costs, the EU bargaining 
process is working this out much as it has prior conflicts about the 
uneven distribution of the costs of integration projects that are 
beneficial overall. East European states take part in the laborious 
accession process because EU membership brings tremendous 
economic and geopolitical benefits —particularly as compared to the 
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uncertain and potentially catastrophic costs of being left behind as 
others move forward” (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003, 43).  
 
Moravcsik and Vachudova concede that the new members from Eastern 
Europe will receive less funding from the Common Agricultural Policy as well 
as the Structural and Cohesion Funds than previous poorer candidate 
countries (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal). In addition, Eastern 
European countries will have to accept a limit of 4% of their gross domestic 
product (GDP) for funding from the EU budget, which is again lower than their 
poorer predecessors (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003). If this was not 
enough, “the applicants will also have to accept special provisions related to 
some areas of European integration, including long transition periods for 
certain benefits such as the free movement of labor and equal access to the 
EU’s agricultural subsidies (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003, 47). However, 
when everything is taken into account, these two authors believe that, in the 
end, membership alone is worth all the temporary restrictions.  
 
The social-constructivist approach, on the other hand, argues that geopolitical 
and economic reasons alone cannot explain costly expansions of the EU. 
Instead, authors who represent this line of thinking bring norm-based 
arguments. Frank Schimmelfennig dismisses Andrew Moravcsik’s rational 
intergovernmentalism on the grounds that it can not explain why the EU 
would offer full membership to Eastern European countries instead of mere 
association.  Instead, he proposes the rhetorical action - the strategic use of 
norm-based arguments - as the intervening mechanism” (Schimmelfennig 




“In an ‘institutional environment’ like the EU, political actors are 
concerned about their reputation as members and about the 
legitimacy of their preferences and behavior. Actors who can justify 
their interests on the grounds of the community's standard of 
legitimacy are therefore able to shame their opponents into norm-
conforming behavior and to modify the collective outcome that would 
have resulted from constellations of interests and power alone” 
(Schimmelfennig 2001, 48). 
 
Schimmelfennig disagrees with Moravcsik’s conclusion that the results of EU 
enlargement negotiations can be explained with bargaining among states.  
Instead he offers sociological institutionalism as an alternative to Moravcsik’s 
rational intergovernmentalism. Schimmelfennig goes on to explain the 
intricate logic of the 2004 enlargement, worth repeating here in its entirety:   
 
“How did rhetorical action intervene in the process of Eastern 
enlargement? Since its beginnings, European integration has been 
legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-
democratic states. This ideology is reflected in the membership rules 
of the EU. Since the Central and Eastern European countries and 
their supporters in the Community did not possess sufficient material 
bargaining power to attain enlargement, they based their claims on 
the constitutive values and norms of the EU and exposed 
inconsistencies between, on the one hand, the EU's standard of 
legitimacy, its past rhetoric, and its past treatment of applicant states 
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and, on the other hand, its policy toward Central and Eastern 
Europe. As a result, the opponents of a firm commitment to Eastern 
enlargement found themselves rhetorically entrapped. They could 
neither openly oppose nor threaten to veto enlargement without 
damaging their credibility as community members. With the support 
of the EC Commission's proposal power and the Council 
presidencies of pro-enlargement member states, the initial objections 
of the Community therefore made way for a principled commitment to 
Eastern enlargement” (Schimmelfennig 2001, 48).   
 
As we have seen so far, theory tackles only distributional conflict among EU 
members and candidate countries. This is because distributional conflict 
cases were, as already pointed out, the most common. We can categorize 
cases of distributional conflict as those that are related to the EU acquis 
communautaire (totality of EU laws, policies, principles and norms) and, at 
the same time, issues that have a strong economic or financial dimension. 
Such cases, some of which have already been elaborated above, can be 
solved with redistribution of measurable costs and benefits between existing 
members and applicant countries, following one of the two mechanisms – 
temporary exclusion or compensation. However, what happens if a conflict is 
of a different, not necessarily economic nature, and is – more importantly - 
not related to the EU acquis? The Greece – Macedonia name dispute and 
Croatia - Slovenia border disputes represent such conflicts. More recently, the 
number of non-distributional conflicts has increased when in December 2012 




Although this category of conflict – a non-distributional conflict - is rarer in the 
history of EU enlargement, it is nonetheless important because the EU has so 
far had a mixed record of solving these types of disputes between an EU 
member and a candidate country. In only one case out of three (that of Italy 
and Slovenia in 1994) has the EU come up with a solution - “the Spanish 
compromise” under the Spanish EU presidency, but only after the Italian 
leadership changed (ESI 2009). In addition, as I argued in the Introduction, 
prolonging the blockades of EU accession negotiations over unsolved 
bilateral disputes could further fuel nationalism and exuberate already tense 
inter-ethnic relations in some parts of the Western Balkans.   
 
Both rational intergovernmentalism and sociological institutionalism discuss 
only distributional conflictsand not bilateral, non-EU acquis related disputes.36 
The two mechanisms (discussed above) of how distributional conflict is 
commonly settled therefore are not applicable for the Croatian and 
Macedonian cases. For example, the Slovenia – Croatia border dispute was 
not settled, as theory would suggest with the exclusion of Croatia from 
temporarily enjoying part of the EU acquis, nor was any party in this conflict 
compensated. Instead, both parties – Slovenia and Croatia – signed a 
contract to settle the border dispute with international arbitration, in 
accordance to international law.   
 
Since 2008, the European Commission has been annually recommending 
that EU negotiations be opened with Macedonia. This is in line with 
Schimmelfennig’s hypothesis that “the EU will be ready to admit any 
                                                
36 Frank Schimmelfennig glances over the Italian veto of Slovenian EU accession 
without offering any thoughts on how it might fit into his theorethical argument.  See 
Schimmelfennig 2001, 56. 
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European state that reliably adheres to the liberal norms of domestic and 
international conduct” (Schimmelfennig 2001, 59). Yet, sociological 
institutionalism alone cannot explain the on-going Greek veto of Macedonian 
EU accession since 2008. Contrary to Schimmelfennig’s argument, Italy, 
Slovenia, Greece and more recently Bulgaria have all blocked EU accession 
negotiations of neighboring candidate countries without damaging their own 
credibility as community members. In fact, one could argue that Greece’s 
success with vetoing Macedonia has attracted Bulgaria in joining the 
blockade. This does not indicate any credibility loss within the EU community. 
On the contrary, the Bulgarian case raises concerns that using unresolved 
bilateral disputes - which are not related to the EU acquis – to block a 
neigbouring EU candidate country, has become an allowed tool. Given the 
plethora of unresolved bilateral problems plaguing the Western Balkan 
countries and yet to be achieved firm inter-ethnic stability, the prospects are 
bleak.  
 
Theory, therefore, does not take into account unresolved bilateral disputes 
that are not related to the acquis and are not economic or financial in nature, 
but instead related to territory, identity or both. Distributional conflict by its 
very definition requires a certain type of conflict to be present for the theory to 
work. The Croatian and Macedonian cases, on the other hand, challenge the 
existing theory by bringing along a different kind of nature of the conflict. 37 
The fact that both represent relatively new examples of conflict between 
existing members and candidate countries in the enlargement process 
                                                
37 Along with the 1994 Italian-Slovenian case and the 2012 Bulgarian blockade of 
Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations.   
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suggests that new theoretical thinking is needed to fully explain them. Before 











3. THE CASE STUDIES: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
 
In the following two chapters I will introduce the reader with the border dispute 
between Slovenia and Croatia – with an emphasis placed on the brunt of the 
dispute, the Bay of Piran – and, the name dispute between Greece and 
Macedonia. Before I proceed with explaining how events unfolded 
chronologically, I will underline common factors between the two cases, 
differences, and draw conclusions theory wise.   
 
The first common factor is nationalism. Nationalism is present in both cases 
and it is an obstacle to finding a solution, as “[giving] in […] would mean 
certain political death” (ISN 2008). Nationalism therefore radicalizes domestic 
politics making the compromise – and a solution - more difficult.  The second 
common factor is territory. Both of these two cases share territory as one of 
the reasons for blockades. My research suggests that non-distributional 
conflict – in all four cases - is related to territory, identity or both.38 I will 
elaborate this further in the final chapter. For the moment I will categorize the 
border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia as a territorial case, whereas 
the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia would fit into the mixed 
category of territory and identity.  
 
The difference between the two cases is that the border dispute has been 
solved while the name dispute has not yet been resolved. Besides the 
obvious, if we look into how all of the cases of non-distributional conflict have 
so far been resolved we will find that good, friendly relations between leaders 
                                                




were present in every case. The good rapport between leaders might not be 
the only factor, there are certainly others, but this one should not be 
underestimated. On the other hand, the unresolved non-distributional conflict 
cases – most notably the name dispute between Greece and Macedonia – 
are in dire need of trust between their leaders (ESI 2014a).    
 
Theory wise, the non-distributional conflict cases deify the dominant 
explanations. First, non-distributional conflict centered on territory and identity 
cannot be settled with the usual mechanisms, that of temporary exclusion or 
compensation. Second, on a more important and wider note, non-
distributional conflict cases illustrate the limits of a narrative that portrays EU 
enlargement as historical unification through economic redistribution. In the 
Western Balkans where state borders have not yet been completely 
consolidated - making the issues of territory and identity to rule domestic 
agenda  - and where nationalism is widespread, the EU’s enlargement theory 
– and the theory of distributional conflict – and EU’s enlargement policy needs 
to be revisited.  
 
3.1. The Case Study of Slovenia-Croatia Border Dispute   
 
The abundance of unresolved bilateral problems plaguing relations between 
the Western Balkan countries, as well as the overwhelming presence of 
nationalism has already been stressed. Therefore it is not surprising that 
relations among these countries are still complex and difficult, even twenty-
two years after the break up of Yugoslavia. If one were to look for two 
neighboring Balkan countries with a history of friendly relations, the trace 
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would undoubtedly lead to Slovenia and Croatia. As Ziga Turk, secretary-
general of the Reflection Group for the Future of Europe summerized:  
 
''Since independence, the relations between Slovenia and Croatia 
were essentially very good. We are one of each others' main trade 
partners, Slovenes are welcome at the Croatian coast and Croats on 
Slovenian ski slopes. A few issues remain unresolved after the 
breakup of Yugoslavia that kept the politicians and journalists busy, 
but did not have much impact on trade, tourism or friendly personal 
relationships. One of the major issues was the border. There are a 
few disputed details on land and a larger chunk of disputed sea” 
(Turk 2010).   
 
However, a simple fact that both countries were for forty-six years part of - 
post-WWII - Yugoslavia meant that after declaring independence in 1991 they 
inherited certain number of shared issues. These problems could be 
characterized by their shared nature – affecting both parties - similar to, for 
example, issues faced by a marriage couple that decides to divorce. The 
three, arguably, most important issues that were the source of complications 
for the two countries since their independence are the co-ownership of the 
nuclear power plant KRŠKO, the question of compensation for Croatian 
depositors of Ljubljanska Banka, and the border dispute in the Piran Bay.39 
And while the first two were a source of fierce political debates lasting for 
                                                
39 The border dispute involves, beside the Bay of Piran, another three locations along 
the land border. “The border on the Mura River in the far northeast of Slovenia around 
the area of the Hotiza border crossing, the Trdinov vrh—a strategically important 
mountain some 30 kilometers from Croatia’s capital and the so-called “disputed 
territory” in the valley of the Dragonja River at its entrance in the Piran Bay” (Avbelj 
and Cernic 2007, 4). Their significance is of lesser importance for my case study and 
argument because they were not the cause of the Slovenian veto.  
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decades, they were eventually settled through combination of dialogue and 
political or legal arrangements.40 More importantly, the conflicts that these two 
issues generated – lasting over two decades - were never allowed to escalate 
into a reason for vetoing Croatian accession negotiations. The same 
conclusion, however, cannot be made for the third bilateral issue, that of the 
border dispute in the Bay of Piran.  
 
3.2. The Bay of Piran  
 
The roots of the dispute over the Bay of Piran predate independence 
declarations of 1991. On top of the intricate historical context lie more 
complicated and more recent legal claims made by both sides. As of this 
writing, the arbitration commission that was formed by Slovenia and Croatia 
to settle the dispute has not yet arrived at a final decision. The arbitration 
commission is still weighing in all the arguments and the ruling is expected 
sometime in late 2014 or early 2015 (Index 2014). Before I introduce the 
historical context and the legal claims, it is worth stating that the core of the 
problem is Slovenia’s access to international waters, which is of strategic 
importance.  
 
                                                
40 The case of Croatian depositors with Ljubljanska Banka has been only settled in 
July 2014 with the rulng of European Court of Human Rights. See 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-17/eu-court-ruling-puts-stress-on-slovenia-
after-bank-rescue.html. For more on long and bitter history of the nuclear power plan 
KRŠKO, see the 2010 presentation by Prof Zeljko Tomšić of University of Zagreb - 
http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/2nd_Dialogue_Forum/Tomsic_INPRO-Vienna-10-2010-








The Piran Bay is a small body of water of approximately 20 square kilometers 
in size and situated in northeast Adriatic, at the very edge of a larger Gulf of 
Trieste.    
 
“The Piran Bay is located within the Trieste Bay locked between the 
Peninsula of Savudrija and the Peninsula of the town of Piran, which 
is known as the Cape Madona. On its north-west side along the 
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Italian coast, the area of the Piran Bay is limited by the state 
maritime border between Italy and the former Yugoslavia. On the 
eastern side, it is limited by the Slovenian coast which runs, in part, 
from the mouth of the Dragonja River to the Peninsula of Savudrija, 
and is under Croatian sovereign jurisdiction” (Avbelj and Cernic 
2007, 3).  
 
Before 1991 and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, two international agreements 
were signed that would later have an impact on legal claims of both countries. 
The first was the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding signed by Italy, the 
UK, the US and Yugoslavia. “According to this Memorandum signed […] the 
administration of a part of the Free Territory of Trieste, including Trieste, Zone 
A, was given to Italy, and a part of it, including the Piran Bay, Zone B, to 
Yugoslavia” (Demir 2009, 149).  Later, in 1975, the Osimo Agreements were 
signed and “were taken over by Slovenia with the exchange of notes in July 
1992” (Avbelj and Cernic 2007, 4). According to the Osimo Agreements, “The 
Free Territory of Trieste was divided definitely [while] Trieste remained part of 
Italy, but Yugoslavia had the right of free entry to the Port of Trieste. By this 
agreement, the territorial and maritime borders between two states [Italy and 
Yugoslavia] were determined” (Demir 2009, 149).   
It could be argued that The Osimo Agreements were the culprits for 
Slovenia’s disputed access to international waters. As Avbelj and Černić 
explain:  
 
 “The maritime border with Italy, which they define, cuts the Trieste 
Bay approximately in the middle. This is important due to the 
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geographical constellation of the Trieste Bay and the Piran Bay 
within it. Namely, […] if the Piran Bay was delimited by the principle 
of equidistance so that the maritime border would be drawn in the 
middle of the Bay, such a delimitation would turn the existing 
Slovenian territorial waters into a box caught between the Italian 
and Croatian territorial seas, whereas Croatia would retain a direct 
maritime border with Italy” (Avbelj and Cernic 2007, 4).  
 
In other words, Slovenia found itself in a paradoxical situation - with a 
coastline of approximately 46 kilometers and yet without direct access to 
international waters. Slovenia’s sea is therefore “boxed” between Italian and 
Croatian territorial waters, as map 3 shows.   
 
After the declarations of independence in June 1991, the border situation was 
further complicated by the fact that borders between the six republics in 
former Yugoslavia were only administrative in nature. However, soon after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, “these administrative borders were proclaimed 
state borders based on the international law principle uti possidetis iuris and 
their valid legal status in the time of status quo—aimed at its peaceful 
preservation—was also confirmed by the Badinter Arbitration Commission” 
(Avbelj and Cernic 2007, 3).  
 
The Badinter Arbitration Commission was set up in August 1991 by the EU to 
“deal with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, [and it] handed down 15 decisions. 
The third among them concerned the border dispute between Croatia and 
Slovenia. According to this opinion, the borders of the republics [that] 
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declared independence would change only by compromise between parties. 
Otherwise, the pre-existing administrative borders would continue to be valid” 
(Demir 2009, 149).  
 
The situation between Slovenia and Croatia did not remain stable for long. In 
1993, Slovenia issued a “Memorandum on the Bay of Piran” which is of 
significance for at least two reasons. First, in the Memorandum Slovenia “for 
the first time […] claims the entire Bay of Piran and the contact with high seas 
in the Adriatic, justifying it by the fact that it is a geographically disadvantaged 
state that cannot declare its exclusive economic zones” (CMFA 2009, 7). 
Second, from this moment on, Slovenia would maintain the same argument – 
claiming the entire Bay of Piran. In a recent hearing before the arbitration 
court – June 2014 – Slovenia maintained this claim (Index 2014).  
 
What followed after 1993 were a series of tit-for-tat events, mainly a large 
number of incidents. 41  The incidents involved physical fights between 
fishermen, police, journalists and even ordinary citizens. 42   Incidents 
intensified after 2007 and lasted until November 2009 when both sides signed 
the Arbitration Agreement (Index 2014).43 Worth nothing, however, were the 
following diplomatic attempts to settle the dispute:  
 
                                                
41 The incidents were referred to by media in both countries as the “bloodless war” 
and were portrayed with a nationalistic narrative. See http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=53176&lng=en and http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=51983&lng=en  
42 “Every time this guy [Joško Joras] has a conflict with the Croatian police, it’s a lead 
item on the television news.” - http://www.local-life.com/ljubljana/articles/border-
dispute.  
43 See for more http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/slovenia_CR%20MoFA-chronology.pdf and 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/slovenia_Non%20paper%20-%20Slo%20-%20Cro%20-
%20%20border%20chronology%20-%2022.2.2009.pdf   
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• July 2001 Drnovšek-Račan Agreement – The agreement, signed 
between the two prime ministers, envisioned giving Slovenia 80% of 
the Bay of Piran, a clause fiercely rejected by the majority of Croatian 
citizens as well as the Croatian political elite. In addition, the 
agreement called upon the establishment of joint border patrol and, 
contained measures to solve disputes between fishermen. However, 
unlike the Slovenian Parliament, its Croatian counterpart never ratified 
the Agreement – a necessary constitutional step to becoming a law. 
(Demir 2009).  
 
• 2008 Initiative by the French EU Presidency – During the French EU 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union- which lasted from 
July to December 2008 - France attempted to mediate the border 
dispute between Slovenia and Croatia. 44 The exact details of this 
initiative are sparse and contradictory, with some claiming that the 
French efforts were “substantial”.45 Others argue that the reason why 
the initiative failed was “because of the low-ranking French diplomats 
employed, and the failure to involve either Sarkozy or French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner in time” (B92 2009).   
 
                                                
44 “The presidency of the Council rotates among the EU member states every six 
months. During this six-month period, the presidency chairs meetings at every level in 
the Council, helping to ensure the continuity of the EU's work in the Council” (CEU 
2014). For more details on the EU Presidency see the official web page of the 
Council of the European Union http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/what-is-the-
presidency?lang=en    
45 French Presidency spokesperson Marine de Carne said:  
"The French Presidency made mediation efforts for weeks, day by day. We have 
proposed solutions, but unfortunately, these have not been conclusive. And the 
Slovenian Prime Minister [Borut Pahor] stated that his country would only sanction 
the opening of one chapter and the closing of three” (EurActiv 2008).  
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• 2009 Olli Rehn’s Initiatives – In January 2009 Olli Rehn - at the time 
serving as the European Commissioner for Enlargement – initiated the 
first of several proposals – in order to settle the border dispute. Just a 
month earlier, in December, Slovenia used its veto power to block 
several chapters of Croatia’s membership negotiations and by doing 
so effectively stopped the accession negotiations. After various 
proposals were reshuffled Rehn made a final – “take it or leave it” – 
proposal in the end of April of 2009. 46 This proposal envisioned a five-
member arbitration panel that would have consisted of one Slovenian 
and one Croatian member, EC representatives and, was planned to 
be headed by Marti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland.  The panel 
would base its decision on International law (EUobserver 2009a). And 
while Croatia accepted the proposal on May 8th, Slovenia offered a 
number of amendments, as the article from EUobserver explains; 
“Details of the amendments have not been made public, but they are 
said to include the so-called principle of fairness Slovenia had been 
insisting on - Ex aequo et bono, Latin for ‘from equity and conscience’. 
In a legal context, the term refers to the encouragement of arbitrators 
to look beyond purely juridical arguments and consider solely what 
they consider to be fair and equitable in the case at hand. [Slovenia] 
was also unhappy that the Commission proposal required that it lift the 
veto to the EU talks with Croatia as soon as the two countries agree to 
the arbitration, saying it could only do so after any form of agreement 
                                                
46 “In an interview with Austrian daily Der Standard last week, Mr Rehn said that he 
had no more ideas and that he hoped to receive positive responses from the two 
countries in the first half of May [of 2009]. ‘I expect a positive response to our 
compromise proposal because my creativity as well as that of the European 
Commission's legal department have been exhausted, and that says something,’ Mr 




has been formally ratified by the two countries. Slovenia has made it 
clear that if its amendments are not taken into account, it could neither 
accept the proposal nor unblock Croatia's EU negotiations. ‘If 
alterations demanded by Slovenia are not accepted, the arbitrage deal 
will not be reached. If the agreement fails, there is no way that 
Slovenia will be forced to unblock Croatian accession talks,’ Slovenian 
Prime Minister Borut Pahor told Slovenian POP TV earlier this month.” 
(EUobserver 2009b).   
In the end the negotiations on this final proposal and amendments 
broke down with Slovenia blocking 13 out of 35 negotiating chapters 
by the end of June (EUobserver 2009c). 
 
3.3. The EU Dimension of the Slovenian Blockade 
 
On December 17th 2008, just two days before the launch of the EU 
intergovernmental conference at which Croatia was hoping to open 10 new 
chapters and close 5, Slovenia decided to use its veto power and block 
Croatian accession negotiations. The reason for blockade was an alleged 
prejudgment of the border in the Bay of Piran, found in the maps that the 
Croatian side submitted during the accession negotiations. At the time the 
Slovenian Prime Minister explained his decision: "Slovenia has reservations 
concerning seven chapters, since the documents presented by Croatia could 
prejudge the common border" […] and concerning another four chapters, we 




Although Slovenia had raised the possibility of a veto as early as 2004, the 
blockade was received as a shock by the Croatian political elite (Kunic 2009) 
and citizens, since hopes were high for a quick conclusion of the EU 
accession negotiations.47 Croatia started the EU negotiation talks in 2005 and 
in November of 2008 the EU Commission’s progress report stated that 
Croatia could conclude the negotiations by the end of 2009 and join the block 
by early 2011 (EUobserver 2008).  
 
A strong response and harsh words followed the initial shock. At the time 
Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader said: "Croatia isn't and won't be ready 
nor will it ever accept blackmail and exclusivism, which have no place in the 
EU... We won't buy our membership of the EU with territory. This is our firm 
position and our friends in Slovenia must know this" (EUobserver 2008).  
  
Despite the Slovenian attempt to justify the blockade by linking the border 
dispute with several chapters of the EU acquis, a number of EU leaders and 
officials were not convinced.48    
 
                                                
47 In May 2007 Vesna Pusić – current Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs – at the 
time the vice president of Croatian Parliament dismissed the idea of linking the border 
dispute with the EU entry talks: “Border dispute cannot be a criteria for EU entry since 
Slovenia itself joined the EU with the same problems and border disputes. This 
dispute is deeply politicized and has become the priority in pre-election campaigns in 
both countries” Similar comments were made at the same time by the Croatian 
President Stjepan Mesić (ISN 2007a). See for more http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=51983&lng=en 
48 As Kristof Bender and Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative – a think 
tank focused on the Western Balkans - argue: “To external observers, the Slovenian 
position is difficult to understand. Any ship using the port of Koper, or indeed the 
Italian port of Trieste, must pass through Croatian, Slovenian and Italian waters. This 
is no big deal, as under international law, all ships enjoy a right of innocent passage 
through the territorial waters of other states. As for fishing, even the option to 
discriminate against Slovenia would disappear once Croatia becomes a EU member” 




On 19th of December, France's European Affairs Minister Bruno Le Maire 
“warned Slovenia not to use the border dispute issue as an excuse to block 
Croatia's accession period. Similarly, Olli Rehn, then European Commissioner 
for Enlargement, called for Slovenia and Croatia to solve this problem among 
them without making it a part of accession talks. The new EU President [of 
European Council, from] Czech Republic also noted that this dispute must be 
solved bilaterally” (Demir 2009, 152).  
 
The European Parliament also urged Slovenia and Croatia to find a 
compromise solution, “stressing that the border disputes were not related to 
Croatia's EU membership. ‘The EU views all border disputes as bilateral 
issues that do not belong to the accession negotiations’” (ISN 2008).  French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy repeated the same message during a meeting with 
Croatian PM Ivo Sanader in early February 2009 (SETimes 2009).  
 
In June 2009, after more than 6 months of blockade and several initiatives by 
the European Commission, patience was, apparently, low among EU officials. 
49  Gergana Noutcheva, South-East Europe analyst for the Center for 
European Policy Studies – one of the Europe’s oldest and leading think tanks 
– commented on Olli Rehn’s statement made at the end of June 2009 by 
saying how "apparently, everyone is fed up [with the issue]" (EUobserver 
2009c). 50 Noutcheva added that Slovenia’s position and stance “did not make 
a good impression”, calling the blockade “a sort of a blackmail” linking it to 
Macedonia’s name dispute and branding it as a “rather Balkan [behaviour] 
                                                
49 See page 50 under ‘2009 Oli Rehn’s Initiatives’. 
50 "The European Commission has tried to help Croatia and Slovenia solve their 18-
year-old dispute. But, after six months of work and discussion, I believe it is up to 




and not very “European”. The other member states should bring Slovenia to 
its senses" (EUobserver 2009c).  
 
Another analyst, Anes Alić from the International Relations and Security 
Network of ETH Zurich, made a similar comment:  
 
“politicians in both countries [Slovenia and Croatia] regularly use this 
issue for election campaigning and raising voters sentiment. And 
now, more that decade later, even if either government would give in, 
it would mean certain political death. […] It is a problem that 
pervades the Balkan countries, where disputes intoxicate the public 
with their xenophobic and intolerant nature. For more than a decade, 
EU member Greece has blocked a bid to join NATO and the EU by 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) over a name 
dispute. [...] in coming years, similar disputes and accession 
obstructions could be implemented elsewhere in the Balkans. Using 
the same method, Croatia could block Bosnia and Herzegovina's EU 
bid, while Serbia could block Kosovo's, and so on” (ISN 2008). 51 
 
More than a year after the Slovenian blockade started, the two sides finally 
agreed to allow an international arbitration panel to settle the two decade old 
                                                
51 ESI – The European Stability Initiative raised this concern during the Slovenia’s 
referendum on the Arbitration Agreement, signed on 4th of November 2009.  “The 
dispute also raises more general questions. What should be the EU’s policy in future 
instances of such bilateral disputes and vetoes? How can the EU address the fact 
that virtually all Yugoslav successor states still have unresolved border issues with at 
least some of their neighbours (including Croatia, which has them with Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia)? How to ensure that future disputes do not 
escalate? And does this case hold any lessons for dealing with other vetoes, such as 
those currently affecting Macedonia’s (by Greece) and Turkey’s (by Cyprus and 
France) accession process? Can this crisis be turned into an opportunity for the EU in 
the Balkans?” (ESI 2010a).  
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dispute.52  On the 4th of November of 2009 the Arbitration Agreement was 
signed in Sweden by Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor and a new 
Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor. 53  The agreement will settle both the 
land border and the bay of Piran (ISN 2009). It obliges both countries to 
adhere to its ruling, which will be based on international  law, the principle of 
equity and good-neighbour relations (Index 2014). 54 However, although the 
signing of the agreement meant the end of Slovenian blockade and 
continuation of Croatian EU accession negotiation, the Agreement was put to 
a referendum in Slovenia. The referendum was held in June 2010 and was 
narrowly voted in favour, clearing the final obstacle on the Croatian path to 
the EU.  (BBC 2010).  
What explains the breakthrough? Although there is no dominant view of how 
the breakthrough happened, media have widely reported an unusually friendly 
non-verbal communication between the new Croatian PM Jadranka Kosor 
and Slovenian PM Borut Pahor (Dnevno 2010). However, before I present my 
argument there are few factors worth reviewing.  
 
First, the road to the Agreement was certainly paved when Croatia removed a 
number of documents from the EU acession negotiations which, according to 
Slovenian diplomats, prejudged the common border (Nacional 2009).  
                                                
52  “The Arbitral Tribunal is chaired by Judge Gilbert Guillaume (France), former 
President of the International Court of Justice. The other members of the Arbitral 
Tribunal are Professor Vaughan Lowe (United Kingdom), Judge Bruno Simma 
(Germany), Dr. Jernej Sekolec (Slovenia), and Professor Budislav Vukas (Croatia)” 
(PCA 2014).   
53  Full text of the Arbitration Agreement: http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/arbitration_agreement.pdf  
54 Ironically, Croatia was from the very beginning of the dispute advocating both the 
application of international law and international arbitrartion as the best ways of 
solving the issue. It was Slovenia that was rejecting both points for a long time.  See 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2009
/02/24/feature-02 and http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=53176&lng=en.    
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Removing the disputed documents alone did not lead to a favourable or 
unfavourable content of the Agreement. Thus, removing the disputed 
documents from negotiations did not bring about an automatic breakthrough 
of the blockade. However, it was a good trust building decision between the 
leaders. The decision was made in early August of 2009, less than a month 
after the new Croatian PM Jadranka Kosor had joined the office (Nacional 
2009).  
 
Second, the Arbitration Agreement cannot be the sole reason for the 
breakthrough, because it contains at least two key elements that Croatia had 
been advocating for a long time and Slovenia was rejecting, namely that the 
border dispute be settled via some kind of international arbitration and, the 
application of international law. Slovenian PM Borut Pahor described the 
Agreement  as “just” and “fair” (Dnevnik 2010). Borut’s support for the 
Arbitration Agreement was an unpopular move in Slovenia. The Agreement 
was harshly criticized by the largest opposition party – SDS, led by the former 
prime minister and a popular politician Janez Janša. He “called on Slovenia to 
reject the deal, [describing it] as ‘capitulation’ and evidence of a ‘servile 
mentality’” (ESI 2010b). Even if we shun Janez’s rhetoric as mere populism, 
opinion polls takenc at the time of the June 2010 referendum “suggest that 
Janša’s campaign is having an impact. What once appeared to be a 
comfortable majority in favour of compromise has now shrunk, and the result 
[of the referendum] could go both ways” (ESI 2010b). And as it was stated in 





Third, the EU pressure is not the single most important factor, although 
extremely relevant, to explain the breakthrough. As showed above, Slovenia’s 
veto was not supported by large EU member states or EU institutions. In this 
regard we have to remember the enourmous diplomatic efforts done by Olli 
Rehn and European Commission, undertaken from January to June of 2009 
to solve the dispute. We should also keep in mind that Jadranka Kosor joined 
the office in early July.  
   
While all the three factors above matter and are relevant, in my opinion the 
determining factor behind the breakthrough is the good rapport between the 
two prime ministers, the new Croatian PM Jadranka Kosor and Slovenian PM 
Borut Pahor. This is one factor that everyone agrees on, and it is an 
explanation that fits into other cases of blockades. As it has already been 
stated above, the breakthrough to the Italian-Slovenian property dispute came 
with the new Italian government, as ESI reports: “the change of the Italian 
political landscape, leading first to technical government under Lamberto Dini 
and then to a centre-left government under Romano Prodi, produced 
immediate improvements in bilateral relations” (ESI 2009). On the other hand, 
complete lack of trust between Greek and Macedonian leaders seems to be 
the core problem of the name dispute (ESI 2014).  
 
Finally, in a joint letter issued by Slovenian and Croatian Foreign Ministers – 
from May 2010 – mutual trust is placed high as the reason for solving the 
dispute: "Mutual appreciation and respect, with personal trust between the 
President of Croatian and Slovenian governments, Jadranka Kosor and Borut 
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Pahor, have enabled a shift in relations between the Croatian and Slovenian 




4. THE CASE STUDY OF MACEDONIA-GREECE NAME DISPUTE 
 
If the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia was to some external 
observers difficult to understand – as Kristof Bender and Gerald Knaus of the 
European Stability Initiative (ESI) pointed out - then it will be even harder to 
find a rational explanation for the twenty-year-old unresolved name dispute 
between Greece and Macedonia. Behind the name dispute is a mixture of 
various issues including culture, history, territory and identity.  
 
 






However bizarre or trivial the dispute might sound, it has so far cost 
Macedonia membership in NATO and a blockade of EU accession 
negotiations, which has been going on since 2009. In cases of many other 
European countries, delay of the membership in Euro-Atlantic associations 
would not have the potential for region-wide negative security repercussions. 
But that is not the case in Macedonia. As several analysts and scholars have 
pointed out, externally, due to Macedonia’s troubled relations with its 
neighbors and, internally, due to strained relations between a large Muslim 
Albanian minority and the Slav-Orthodox majority, stability in the country has 
not yet been achieved. As Karajkov explains, “if the Macedonian political 
camp would choose to stray from Euro-Atlantic integration to protect the 
name, Albanians [citizens of Macedonia, not Albanian citizens in Albania] 
would disagree, and that could be an intro to a serious political crisis” 
(Karajkov 2008a).   
 
A similar conclusion – but wider in geographical scope -  is raised by George 
Papavizas: 
 
Despite considerable progress made over the past ten to twelve 
years, a close look at the small country and its immediate 
neighborhood reveals that the situation remains fragile. Its internal 
economic and demographic problems are compounded by the 
problems FYROM has with its five neighbors: Albania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Kosovo, and Serbia. The problems vary in severity from 
small nuisances to serious complications that may threaten Balkan 
stability (Papavizas 2012, 43).  
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More recently, Corina Stratulat, senior policy analyst at the European Policy 
Centre (EPC) - a think tank based in Brussels - has stressed “although peace 
has taken hold of the region, Balkan countries are still not all in [the EU] and 
certainly they are not all transformed as we had envisioned, and the policy is 
stuck for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia for 
example […] The situation has gotten worse for some countries and there are 
huge [stability] risks associated with Bosnia [and Herzegovina] or Macedonia” 
(EurActiv 2014).  
 
Joining this chorus of negative assessments is the European Stability 
Initaitive – a think tank that focuses entirely on South East Europe and EU 
enlargement – which paints a bleak picture of today’s Macedonia:  
 
“Macedonia is stuck. Few, if any, disagree. Macedonia is poor. There 
are very few jobs. It is isolated internationally. Its EU accession 
process has lost all credibility. […] And yet, any successes or 
breakthroughs were never enough to put the country on a clear 
reform path that would overcome its poverty, isolation, polarised 
politics and lack of perspective. Today, in 2014, all roads appear cut 
off. The one thing most Macedonians (and outside observers) can 
agree on is that the situation is bad, that it is unlikely to get better 
soon, and that very little depends on what is being done by 
Macedonians themselves” (ESI 2014b)  
 
What the analysts at the ESI are implying is that external actors, among them 
most notably the EU, have the critical leverage over the future of the country. 
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In fact, the EU has already played a pivotal role in Macedonia’s recent history 
when European diplomats brought the country back from a brink of civil war in 
2001 and it is largely responsible for wide ranging reforms (Radeljic 2013). 
EU relations with Macedonia have gone through at least three phases since 
the country gained independence in December 1991, however, the EU’s role 
has not always been positive for Macedonia. The first period started from 
gaining independence to signing of the EU Stabilization and Accession 
Agreement (SAA) in 2001. The second period follows from 2001 and SAA, 
and ends in December 2005 when the European Council granted Macedonia 
EU candidate status. The last period follows the candidature and lasts until 
today. The duality of EU’s role in Macedonia and the rest of the Western 
Balkan countries, that of an active player and of a framework for integration, 
has been well discussed.55  
 
The EU’s position towards Macedonia changed as soon as the Community 
officially recognized Slovenian and Croatia, with the EU starting to provide aid 
to Skopje and taking interest in the country’s political and economic stability 
(Radeljic 2013). 
Macedonia was far from stable. On the one hand, failure to secure 
international recognition brought down the government of the first Prime 
Minister Nikola Kljusev in summer of 1992. On the other hand, domestic 
antagonism between the Albanian Muslim minority and Slav-majority began to 
work its way toward a brink of civil war. According to Radeljić, “aware of the 
[ethnic] problems, [Macedonian] President Gligorov managed to convince the 
UN first to deploy a preventive mission, UNPREDEP (initially UNPROFOR), 
                                                
55 For a good overview see chapter four by Simonida Kacarska in Radeljic 2013.  
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and then to extend its mandate, primarily to monitor borders and prevent 
internal clashes” (Radeljic 2013, 10). Unfortunately, the gap between the two 
communities grew larger until incidents and confrontations started appearing 
across the country, sparked by the Albanian demand to have university 
curriculum in their native language. “The clashes intensified the polarization of 
inter-ethnic relations in the country and increased concerns the radical 
Albanian leadership would succeed in “homogenizing” the ethnonationalist 
agenda of the Albanian community and integrating its various political parties” 
(Leatherman et al. 1999, 162).  
 
The 1998 Report by International Crisis Group offers an insight into the 
Gordian knot of various inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia and neighboring 
states:  
 
“Ethnic Albanians [in Macedonia] overwhelmingly support their kin in 
Kosovo. Ethnic Macedonians [ethnic Slavs] tend to draw parallels 
between Kosovo Albanian demands for independence and ethnic 
Albanian politics in Macedonia, believing that Albanian demands for 
increased rights in Macedonia undermine the ethnic Macedonian 
identity and by extension the Macedonian nation and the 
Macedonian State. They therefore increasingly identify with the 
Serbian side. Ethnic Macedonians tend also to view Albanians as a 
minority that, while entitled to certain rights under the constitution - a 
constitution which declares Macedonian the sole official language, 
and the Macedonian Orthodox Church the official creed -- should not 
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be granted greater rights than those accorded to other minorities” 
(ICG 1998).  
  
Between 1996 and 2001 Macedonia was a “deeply divided society [in which] 
the rural poor – and ethnic Albanians in particular – have little stake in FYR 
Macedonia as a nation [and where] political competition is still very much as 
‘winners-takes-all’” (Investment Development Consultancy 2001, 2).   
European Comission’s 2002 report on Macedonia, stresses the fact that “the 
country was several times near to civil war (EC 2002). Civil war did not 
happen because of the Western-brokered 2001 Ohrid Agreement, signed 
between the Albanian minority and Macedonian Slav majority (Radeljic 2013). 
At the same time, Macedonia signed the EU Stabilization and Association 
Agreement and amended the constitution so it did not present Macedonia “as 
the state of Macedonian people”, which had an issue of contestation with 
Greece  (Radeljic 2013, 12).   
 
In 2004 Macedonia applied for EU membership and gained candidate status 
in 2005, which started the new phase in EU relations with Macedonia 
(Radeljic 2013).  
 
Macedonia was successful in meeting all the requirements for joining NATO - 
along with Croatia – at the Alliance’s Bucharest summit in April 2008. In the 
end however, only Croatia received an invitation for membership while 
Greece vetoed Macedonia, despite the apparent diplomatic pressure from the 
US (Karajkov 2008a). The following year, Greece would veto the beginning of 
EU negotiation talks, using the same argument - the name dispute.  
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4.1. The Root Cause of the Name Dispute  
 
As it has been already stated above, behind the name dispute lie several 
issues, most notably culture, history, territory and identity that together create 
a potent cocktail in a highly nationalistic Balkan political context. However, the 
very root cause for all these issues stem from Greek (and more recently 
Bulgarian) skepticism - if not outright dismissal - of Macedonian identity and 
history. “Macedonia has identity issues with all of its neighbors: Greece does 
not recognize the name; Bulgaria does not recognize the language and the 
nation; Serbia, or the Serbian Orthodox Church does not recognize the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church; with Albania and Kosovo Macedonia shares 
the issue of its sizable Albanian community, which is 24% of the country's 
total” (Karajkov 2008b).  Argubly nowhere in Europe can a similar situation 
can be found today. As Tony Barber illustrates:   
 
“For their roots [various issues Macedonia has with its neighbours] 
are to be found in the bitterly contested nature of modern 
Macedonian national and geographical identity. Nowhere in Europe – 
not in Northern Ireland, not in the Hungarian-populated lands of 
central Europe, not among ethnic Russians in Estonia, Latvia and 
Ukraine – is the question of identity as vexed. The Macedonian 
question is both cause and effect of a profound tension among 
states, churches and peoples that has agitated the Balkans since the 
late 19th century For a long time neither Bulgarians nor Serbs 
accepted the existence of a distinct Slav Macedonian people, each 
preferring to view them as components of the Bulgarian and Serbian 
66 
 
nations. Both Bulgaria and Serbia did, at least, grant Macedonia 
official recognition within its present borders after it declared 
independence from communist Yugoslavia in 1991. Yet disputes 
persist: the size, national consciousness and political status of a 
Macedonian minority in Bulgaria; a Bulgarian minority in Macedonia; 
and the refusal of Serbia’s Orthodox Church to recognise the 
autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which seceded 
from its Serbian parent in 1967. As for Greece, it chose to regard 
Macedonia’s proclamation of independence as the first step to a 
territorial claim on a province of northern Greece that also is called 
Macedonia. By refusing to recognise the former Yugoslav republic 
under the name of Macedonia, Greece has blocked the new state’s 
path to EU and Nato membership – even though the EU accepted 
Macedonia as an official candidate in 2005” (FT 2013).  
 
Even within academia there are scholars who share similar sentiments about 
Macedonia. For example, this is how George Papavizas explains Macedonian 
identity in a 2010 article published by Mediterranean Quarterly (Duke 
University Press):   
 
“To put the Slavic “Macedonian” ethnogenesis and the rise of false 
Slavic Macedonianism into proper perspective, we must also go back 
to 1862 and trace the origin and sentiments of FYROM’s Slav 
speakers and their ethnic transformations through the years before 
their final communist-controlled conversion to “Macedonians.” They 
were Bulgarians from 1862 to 1913 and Serbianized Slavs from 1913 
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until the German occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941. Bulgarians again 
proudly brandished Bulgarian and Nazi German flags during the 
occupation of southern Yugoslavia by the fascist Bulgarian army (a 
Hitler gift to Bulgaria for joining Nazi Germany during World War II). 
They were Yugoslav communist partisans during the occupation and, 
finally, communist “Macedonians” by 1945, with new roots, history, 
and a new “Macedonian” language, a modification of the Bulgarian 
language by Tito’s communist regime” (Papavizas 2010).  
 
In addition, Thessaloniki based Institute for Balkan Studies published an 
entire volume in attempt to convince European audience that Macedonian 
identity is recent and non-rooted in history (Institute for Balkan Studies 1993).   
 
4.2. History of the Name Dispute 
 
The name dispute between Greece and Macedonia started soon after 
Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia – December 1991.  As 
Radeljić explains: “The process of international recognition of the new 
Macedonian state – severely affected by numerous Greek protests generated 
by the country’s new name and consequent embargo, represented the main 
challenge of the new leadership” (Radeljic 2013, 9). It would take one a half 
years for Macedonia to be recognized by the UN because of Greek 
resistance. Greece’s argument can be summarized in the following way: 
“Greece claims that the term Macedonia refers to the historical Kingdom of 
Macedon and that its use in a neighbouring country's name would usurp an 
essential part of exclusively "Greek" culture and heritage. It also contends that 
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the use of the name Macedonia implies territorial ambitions on a northern 
Greek province that bears the same name” (ESI 2014a).  
As was the case with other former Yugoslav republics at the time, nationalism 
was present from early days of Macedonia’s newly gained independence. The 
sources of Greece concern originate from the very first drafts of the 
Macedonian constitution. According to Papavizas, articles 3 and 49 of the 
preamble found in the first draft of the Macedonian constitution “announced 
that the boundaries of the new republic also included Greek Macedonia” 
(Papavizas 2010, 86). The articles were omitted in the second draft; however, 
“the final draft included an appeal to the “Macedonians” of Greece to continue 
their ethnic struggle for union with the new “Macedonia,” an addition implying 
a future threat against Greece’s territorial integrity” (Papavizas 2010, 86).  As 
already mentioned above, during the time when the EU Stabilization and 
Association Agreement was being signed – around 2001 - the constitution 
was amended and these statements were removed.56  
 
In the early days of Macedonian statehood, after the name issue first 
appeared, the EU sided with its member Greece, however, not necessarily 
because of the strength of the Greek case:  
 
“most observers agreed that the EC states supported Greece on the 
Macedonian issue, not because of the merits of the Greek case, but 
because the EC Council of Ministers recognized the right of member 
states to exercise an unofficial veto on issues that affect their 
national interests. Furthermore,  in exchange [for] EC support on the 
                                                
56 “Macedonia also made amendments to its constitution, expressly denying any 




Macedonian issue Greece promised to ratify the Maastricht Treaty 
[…] in addition, Greece also promised to support EC sanctions 
againt Serbia, a traditional ally of Greece, and to ratify an EC 
financial protocol with Turkey, a traditional enemy of Greece” 
(Danforth 1995, 150).     
 
Soon after Macedonia gained international recognition, the EU changed its 
position and started perceiving the issue as a bilateral dispute (Karajkov 
2008b). 
 
At the UN, Greek lobbying succeeded in assigning Macedonia with a 
temporary name until both sides are able to solve the dispute. Thus, on 7th of 
April 1993 the United Nations Security Council recognized Macedonia as 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Papavizas 2010). Greece 
justified this demand because its own northern province bears the same 
name – Macedonia.57  
 
Even after being accepted as a UN member, Greece did not recognize 
Macedonia. Instead, it imposed a trade embargo that was exceptionally 
damaging to a land-locked country, which depends on Greece’s ports (ESI 
2014) One estimate puts the cost of embargo to about two billion dollars 
(Karajkov 2008b). The embargo lasted until 2005 when both countries signed 
                                                
57 Somewhat ironically there seem to be dozens of places around the world with the 
same name! “Reportedly, there are 39 other places on the Planet which are called 
Macedonia: some 27 towns throughout the US, some of them host to the Macedonian 
diaspora; 3 in Columbia; 2 in Brazil; 1 in Cuba; 1 on Martinique; in Bulgaria there is 
the region of Pirin Macedonia and a town with a version of the name; in Greece there 
are 3 regions which contain the name Macedonia (Karajkov 2008b).  
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the Interim Agreement. The Agreement helped normalize relations between 
the two neighbors, for a while.58  
However, soon after both parties seem to have broken the provisions of the 
Agreement. While some blame Macedonia: 
 
“FYROM violated basic norms of international behavior and almost 
every provision of the Interim Accord, paying Greece back for its 
assistance and generosity with a constant barrage of anti-Hellenic 
propaganda, provocations in the media and on the Internet, and 
distortions of history. It accused Greece of unjustifiably using the 
name “Macedonia” and it printed schoolbooks and pseudo-bank 
notes depicting Greek heroes as FYROM heroes and Greek 
landmarks as FYROM landmarks. It also circulated maps showing 
itself as part of a “Greater Macedonia,” including Greek Macedonia 
— with Thessaloniki — down to Mt. Olympus. It used its member- 
ship status in the Council of Europe in 1995 to promote its nationalist 
aims, including “redemption” of the “Macedonian minorities” in 
Greece. To provoke Greece, FYROM renamed the airport in Skopje 
Alexander the Great Airport. It inculcated in young minds the defunct 
communist expansionist tendencies and the idea to hate Greeks, a 
violation of Article 7 of the Interim Accord. Worst of all, it violated 
Article 11 of the accord, which states that FYROM may not use any 
name other than “FYROM,” its temporary name, until an agreement 
is reached on the name.” (Papavizas 2010, 88).  
                                                
58 For example, Greece became an important foreign investor with en estimate of 
having approximately 80% control – directly or indirectly – over the Macedonian 




 Others point finger at Greece: 
 
“In April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Greece rejected all 
proposals by the Macedonian government and UN mediator Matthew 
Nimetz – including the name "Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)" – and 
vetoed Macedonia's accession to NATO. As Macedonia would have 
also agreed to accede as the "Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia", the Greek veto was nothing but a clear breach of the 
1995 Interim Agreement” (ESI 2014a).59  
 
During all this time, the UN mediated the dispute with no success with 
numerous names being proposed and rejected over the years. 60  While 
Macedonia insists on a dual-solution – “meaning Republic of Macedonia for 
the world; and a different name which would be agreed with Greece for 
bilateral relations”– Greece insists that the future name should be included in 
the Macedonian constitution and used with the rest of the world (Karajkov 
2008b)61. However, more than one hundred countries have so far recognized 
Macedonia by its constitutonal name – the Republic of Macedonia - including 
all UN Security Council permanent members except France, further 
complicating the dispute (ISN 2007b). 
                                                
59 In December 2011 the International Court of Justice ruled that Greece had indeed 




60 Some of the proposed names include: Upper Macedonia, Northern Macedonia, 
New Macedonia, Republic of Skopje, Republic of Macedonia – Skopje, Slav-
Macedonia, Vardar Republic, Vardar Macedonia.  
61 “Some in Greece want to go further and also change the name of the people 
("Macedonians") and the language ("Macedonian"), something that any government 





The 2008 veto on NATO membership provided Macedonian elites with yet 
another reason to further radicalize domestic politics: “the country’s leaders 
have given full vent to their frustrations. Blocked from joining the EU and 
Nato, and unable or unwilling to find a lasting political settlement with the 
ethnic Albanians, the nationalists who dominate the political stage decided 
five years ago to refashion their state, turning it into one that glorifies Slav 
Macedonian identity rather than find space for citizens of all ethnic origins” 
(FT 2013).  
 
As ESI points out, complete lack of trust between Greek and Macedonian 
leadership seems to be the core problem of the name dispute (ESI 2014a). 
As we have seen already, the good rapport between state leaders – or a lack 
of it - seems to be the determining factor in whether or not a breakthrough will 
happen. Judging by the four cases of blockade, good rapport between state 
leaders could perhaps be described as a necessary but not sufficient cause 





5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The history of EU enlargement is full of numerous cases of conflict, as 
Christina J. Schneider (Schneider 2009) rightly pointed out. Indeed, looking 
back at all the waves of EU enlargement so far - starting with 1973 when the 
UK, Denmark and Ireland acceded, to 2004 when 10 new members, mostly 
from Eastern Europe, joined the EU - one could easily argue that the history 
of EU enlargement is about conflict resolution as much as it is about reuniting 
the continent and spreading peace. What is important to stress, however, is 
that the type of conflict that was prevalent during the enlargement is the 
distributional conflict, characterized by its economic and financial nature. That 
kind of conflict, as we have seen, can be settled by using two mechanisms – 
temporary exclusion of the new EU member from enjoying a part of the EU 
acquis communautaire, or compensation of the existing EU member. Only 
recently, however, a new type of conflict has emerged in the story of EU 
enlargement. The non-distributional conflict is a more recent phenomenon, 
starting with Italian blockade of Slovenia in 1994. Unlike the distributional 
conflict that revolves around economic and financial issues, the cases of non-
distributional conflict have very different nature and are rooted in territory, 
identity or a mixture of both. Table 1 shows classification of the four cases of 
non-distributional conflict. It is important to point out that the category of 
identity includes culture and history, as the name dispute between Greece 
and Macedonia, as well as the recent Bulgarian blockade, demonstrate.  









Territory Identity Both Identity 
and Territory 
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Table 1: Classification of the non-distributional conflict cases.62  
 
In addition, cases of non-distributional conflict are also always marked by 
nationalism which, in the long run presents an obstacle to finding a solution. 
All in all, these cases cannot be explained by either Frank Schimmelfennig’s 
social-constructivist approach or Andrew Moravcsik’s rational 
intergovernmentalism. They are a puzzle that requires new thinking.  
 
                                                
62  As I have already mentioned above, the blockade of Turkish accession 
negotiations by France and Cyprus - that started in 2010 – could easily fit both 
categories of identity – in the case of France – and territory – in the case of Cyprus.  
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To understand why the non-distributional conflict cases only started 
appearing late in the story of EU enlargement, and why they seem to be 
almost exclusively present in the Western Balkans, one needs to understand 
contemporary history, as well as culture and mentality of the peoples in the 
region. Unlike in the Iberian Peninsula, the Nordic countries, or even Central 
Europe, state formation in the Western Balkans – including in some cases 
identity formation – is still work in progress. Some countries in the Balkan 
region – for example Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro – are in a better 
position, meaning their statehood is not being challenged anymore by internal 
or external actors. However, several other countries – including Serbia, 
Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia – are not yet in the same 
position. In such a domestic socio-political environment, nationalism is used 
to rally ethnic groups – often against the “other” - and reinforce challenged 
identities.  
 
In terms of solutions, since the EU does not have an institutional mechanism 
for solving non-distributional conflict cases – but rather ad-hoc, case-by-case 
diplomatic initiatives - nor it has a norm or a written rule that would forbid 
vetoes over non-EU acquis matters, what we have learned so far is that good 
rapport between state leaders is most likely a critical factor in generating a 
breakthrough. That was certainly the case with Italian blockade of Slovenia, 
and later Slovenian blockade of Croatia. Moreover, as I have pointed out 
above, in case of the Greece and Macedonia name dispute, good rapport is 




Therefore, after examining all the cases of non-distributional conflict I have 
proposed the following argument: If two neighbouring countries - one being 
an EU member, the other an EU candidate country - have unresolved issues 
related to territory, identity or both, the likelihood of blockade will increase. 
 
One way to test my argument will be to closely follow future enlargements of 
the Western Balkan countries, where there are still many unresolved issues 
pertaining to territory and identity. Moreover, it will be interesting to keep an 
eye on Moldova and Transnistria, if they ever decide to join the EU. Given 
their troubled history, Romania might block Moldova over territory and 
identity, while Moldova might do the same to Transnistria over, again, territory 
and identity.  
 
However, what distinguishes the Western Balkans from other European 
regions and countries, including Moldova and Transnistria is the shadow of 
ethno-nationalistic conflict. As Peter Stano, spokesman for European 
Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle, recently stressed: "Together we are 
stronger, and especially in the Western Balkans, we contribute to the 
reconciliation among nations and to guaranteeing peace and reinforcing 
stability in a region marked by conflicts in a not so distant past" (CNN 2014).  
And as I have argued in the Introduction, it is the EU that holds the key to the 
long-term peace and stability of the Western Balkans. While in many Western 
European countries EU scepticism is on the rise, opinion polls across the 
Western Balkans have repeatedly showed people’s preference for joining the 




There is however a real concern that the EU will once again misunderstand 
the situation and fail to react, similar to what happened in the early 1990s. As 
Mark Almond painfully illustrates:  
 
However much the EC leaders liked to think in the long term – 
charting the future of a continent like master mariners setting forth on 
the great ocean – the leaders of the Twelve [EU members] proved 
remarkably lacking in foresight when it came to anticipating events in 
the Balkans. Not only were they taken by surprise by the flare-up of 
fighting in Slovenia, but they refused to be distracted from each fresh 
outbreak of violence to consider the big picture. For instance, already 
in July 1991 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was so 
alarmed by the scale of the fighting along its north-western borders 
inside Croatia and the involvement of JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army] 
and militias based in Bosnia that it asked the EC to engage in 
preventive diplomacy […] The Twelve displayed sovereign contempt 
for Sarajevo’s attempt to distract them from their central 
preoccupation […] Buffeted by the high tide of history, the Twelve 
continued according to routines better suited to calmer waters 
(Almond 1994, 242-3). 
 
I will conclude by reiterating my argument from the very beginning of this 
thesis that the EU enlargement is an unfinished business despite the 
dominant narrative that wants us to believe that after the 2004 enlargement, 
Europe is finally united. More importantly, membership in the EU is the only 
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